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SEARCHING FOR TENURE SECURITY? 
The Land System and New Policy Initiatives In Ethiopia 
Dessalegn Rahmato 
Abstract 
This study examines broadly the Federal land policy framework as well as 
legislation pertaining to land issued recently by the four main Killils, namely, 
Tigrai, Amhara, Oromia and Southern Killil. It also looks into the new initiatives 
undertaken by the government to address the problems of tenure insecurity, namely 
user right documentation, underway in Amhara and Tigrai, and resettlement. 
Critics of the land system have argued that the policy promotes insecurity of tenure 
because it allows, among other things, periodic redistribution, is inefficient because 
it constrains land transactions and has inhibited the emergence of a dynamic land 
market, promotes fragmentation of land and growing pressure on land resources 
because it discourages rural people from leaving their farms for other employment 
opportunities; it also gives the state immense power over the farming population 
because land is state property. The legislations issued by the different Killils are not 
in harmony with each other or with Federal legislation, and, all except that issued 
by Oromia, have not sufficiently addressed the main causes of tenure insecurity. 
One of the new initiatives being tried out in Tigrai and Amhara is user right 
documentation. Documentation is being undertaken within existing legal and policy 
frameworks. While it may be too early to judge, it does appear that documentation 
has promoted a sense of security among peasants who have received the documents. 
This is to be welcomed. However, the documents do not entitle holders any more 
benefits than those contained in existing legislations. Holders cannot use the 
document as collateral to borrow from financial institutions. Documentation has 
been undertaken for the most part without the use of modern surveying and 
mapping techniques. Documentation by itself, however well it is undertaken, will 
not be sufficient to ensure full tenure security. The resettlement program now under 
way is a cause for great concern. The program is already facing many difficulties 
because it was carried out without adequate preparation, and under the erroneous 
assumption that there is plenty of unused arable land in each Killil to accommodate 
a large settler population. 
The study concludes by stressing the need for a fresh public debate on the land 
question, focusing on tenure security (instead of tenure regimes as has been the 
case in the past) because, despite government's objections, the subject is too 
important to be ignored. 
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Preface 
This study is published in the hope that it will contribute, even if in a small way, 
to the public debate on the land question in this country. I am hopeful the work 
will be of some use for two main reasons. First, there has been a growing 
demand for reasoned debate on rural land tenure and the economic, social and 
political consequences associated with it for quite some time. The demand has 
come from many social sectors and interest groups, including civil society 
organizations, the media, the private sector, the donor community and 
academia. It may seem paradoxical but the need for greater informed discussion 
on the subject has been fuelled by the government's continued refusal to be 
drawn into the debate and its adamant position that as far as it is concerned the 
land issue is a "dead issue". On the other hand- and this is the second reason for 
publishing this work- the existing debate has been bogged down in what is 
turning out to be a sterile argument over ownership regimes. The single-mined 
determination to convince that state or private ownership is more appropriate 
for this country has impoverished the debate. 
I believe it is now necessary to shift the focus of the debate away from 
tenure regimes to tenure security if we wish to arrive at a fruitful outcome. In 
the last section of this study I have sketched out what I consider to be a starting 
point for the search for security of rights to land. Obviously, any informed 
debate on security will have to take into account the country's agrarian history 
of the last half century on the one hand, and on the other the relevant 
experiences of other countries in Africa and elsewhere. 
This study began life as a presentation in a panel discussion organized by 
the Ethiopian Economic Association several years ago (EEA 1997; also 1999). 
It has since been extensively revised, expanded and updated on a number of 
occasions. Various versions of it have been presented in public forums 
organized by a number of civil society organizations, and submitted as a 
commissioned report to a couple of international donor agencies. The present 
draft has benefited from all the comments that were made on earlier drafts. 
For the discussion of user right documentation, I have benefited from a 
short field trip undertaken in May and June 2004. An assistant of mine visited 
both Amhara and Tigrai Killils to gather information from the relevant offices, 
and was able to interview a number of government officials, peasants, peasant 
leaders and others regarding the administration and significance of the 
documents. At the time of writing it was only the two Killils which had an on-
going program of user right documentation. 
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1. Introduction 
This study is based on Federal and Killil' policy documents, information 
gathered on a recent short field visit to Amhara and Tigrai, a select number of 
published and unpublished material, and my own field experience over the last 
two decades. The discussion will focus on the broad Federal policy framework 
as well as legislation issued by the four main Killils, namely, Tigrai, Amhara, 
Oromia and Southern Killil. It will also examine the new initiatives undertaken 
by the government to address the problems of tenure insecurity, namely the 
issuance of user documents, underway in Amhara and Tigrai, and resettlement. 
The work is concerned with tenure policy as it applies to farmland held by 
settled farming communities in the highlands of the four Killils. I shall leave out 
land held by pastoralists and the legislation of the predominantly pastoralists 
Killils such as Afar, Somali, and Gambella2. 
The three decades since the mid-1970s have been times of profound and 
rapid change in Ethiopia, which have been accompanied by a high degree of 
institutional instability, particularly in the rural areas. Not only has the country 
witnessed three political regimes, but also significant economic and social 
policy reforms impacting on property ownership, state structures, and resource 
management (see Annex 1 at the end of this study). The policy framework that 
is at the center of all these changes, and which has been an important factor in 
the poor performance of the rural economy is the radical reform of agrarian 
relations set in motion with the promulgation of the land reform in the mid-
19708. Reform defined the parameters of the property system in force today, 
including rights of access to land and to environmental resources. 
The land reform of the Derg, which in large measure is still the basis of the 
present land system, had noble intentions, and many, including this writer, 
believe that it was a necessary measure to bring to an end the archaic land 
system of the Imperial regime and the exploitation of the peasant population. 
The initial legislation was welcomed by a majority of the peasantry but 
subsequent policies and practices transformed what was potentially a positive 
measure into a cause for rural insecurity and growing poverty (Dessalegn 1993). 
The reform abolished all customary rights to land and vested in the state 
the power to redefine rights of property and access to land. It dispossessed the 
landed classes and distributed land to peasants who were organized in Peasant 
Associations and who were entitled to land as residents of their kebelles. The 
peasant had only usufruct rights to the land which he/she could not transfer to 
others except to children who themselves were not beneficiaries of the reform. 
These usufruct rights were moreover dependent on the peasant's continued 
residence in the kebelle. Land transfers could only be possible through periodic 
1 I prefer the term Killil rather than Region because the latter term does not correspond to the 
Amharic word; it is also confusing in some contexts. 
2 To the best of my knowledge none of the pastoralist Killils have issued land legislation. 
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re-distributions. Each child on reaching the age of eighteen was entitled to a plot 
in his or her kebelle, and this meant that redistribution was inevitable. In the 
period up to the second half the 1980s, there were between three and four 
redistributions in various parts of the country. Naturally enough, many peasants 
ended up losing a portion of their land after each redistribution, and there was 
thus what may be called a dynamic process of levelling down (for more details, 
see Dessalegn 1984). We should add to this the fact that parents also distributed 
parcels of their plots to their children according to local customary inheritance 
and endowment practices, with the net result that the family holding was further 
sub-divided. 
Critics of both the Derg's and present land system have argued that the 
policy promotes insecurity of tenure because it allows, among other things, 
periodic redistribution (or at least the threat of redistribution hangs over many 
peasants), is inefficient because it constrains land transactions and has inhibited 
the emergence of a dynamic land market, promotes fragmentation of land and 
growing pressure on land resources because it discourages rural people from 
leaving their farms for other employment opportunities, and gives the state 
immense power over the farming population because land is state property 
(Dessalegn 1994; Bruce, Hoben and Dessalegn 1994; Tekie 2000a,b; EEA 
2002), 
2. Current Tenure Policy 
2.1. The Policy Framework 
The present government's land policy is for the most part similar to that of the 
Derg. What is significant in the present case is that land policy is now enshrined 
in the Constitution which entitles each adult in the rural areas that wishes to live 
by farming land sufficient for his/her livelihood; access to land for rural persons 
is thus a right. Land is here defined as the property of the people but is 
administered on their behalf by the state3. In effect land is still state property, 
and peasants thus have only use rights over plots they have in their possession. 
This principle is reproduced in all Killil legislations. Land cannot be sold, 
exchanged or mortgaged, but the present policy does allow short term leasing or 
sharecropping as well as the hiring of labour, both of which were illegal under 
the Derg. 
Current policy also allows the transfer of land to one's heirs, though some 
Killils have put conditionalities on such transfers. The 1997 Tigrai land 
proclamation, for instance, allows only siblings who are dependent on their 
parents to inherit land from them; siblings who either have land of their own or 
3 The key articles in the Constitution regarding land tenure are: Article 40, sub-articles 3, 4, 6, and 
7; and article 52, sub-article (d) (FDRE 1995). 
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derive "sufficient" livelihood from non-agricultural activities are not entitled. 
However, according to Federal policy, periodic land redistribution remains the 
main measure by which land is transferred from one user to another. The 
Federal government's new rural development policy document states that the 
government will have the right to redistribute land whenever it finds it 
necessary. The document concedes that periodic redistribution does not 
contribute to tenure security, but says its bad side must be weighed against its 
good side, namely the opportunity it provides the young and landless to get 
rights to land. It suggests as a compromise that tenure security may be promoted 
if Killil authorities were to assure rights holders that there will be no 
redistribution for 20 or 30 years (FDRE 2001: 68, 81-83). 
The 1997 Federal land administration proclamation sets out guidelines for 
future land redistribution, and transfers the power to administer land, including 
the power of redistribution, to the Killils. 
At present the administration of land has been vested in the Environment 
Protection and Land Administration and Use Authority (EPLAUA) which has 
recently been established by law in each Killil. Each Authority is responsible 
also for environmental protection and natural resource management. Each has a 
management board accountable to the Killil president. While some of the Killil 
legislations were issued before this Authority was established, the body has 
been given the power to draft legislation and issue policy guidelines. All the 
four Killils have now issued land administration and land use legislations. The 
broad measures adopted by all Killil legislations conform to the Federal 
legislation, however, there are significant differences and discrepancies in some 
respects as will be pointed out below. We should note that there have been some 
attempts especially by the later legislations to address some of the concerns 
raised by critics of the land systems noted above. The earliest land legislations 
were those issued in Tigrai and Amhara; these were subsequently followed by 
Oromia and Southern Killil. 
There is unanimity in all Killil legislations that land is state property and 
that the rights holder has only use rights over the land. Thus private property in 
land and the right to permanent transfer by sale, mortgage or other means of 
exchange is prohibited. In all Killils, rights to land are subject to a wide variety 
of conditions, failure to comply with which may lead to the loss of one's 
holdings. The legislations of Amhara and Tigrai either explicitly state or 
strongly imply that access to land is conditional on continued residence in one's 
kebelle or in the rural area. Moreover, the threat of periodic redistribution has 
been laid to rest explicitly only in the Oromia legislation, as we shall see further 
down. 
The 1997 proclamation issued by Tigrai does not expressly rule out future 
land redistribution, though it does not expressly refer to it. However, the 
legislation (as well as the amendment issued in 2002) recognizes that all the 
provisions contained in it are in conformity with Federal legislation. The 
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proclamation also states that a rights holder who has left his or her kebelle for 
over two years forfeits his or her rights and the land in question will be 
reallocated by the kebelle council to landless members of the community. 
Rights holders here have the obligation to undertake soil and water conservation 
measures and to care for the trees on their land. They are not allowed to grow 
plant species that are "harmful" to the soil. While it is not specifically spelt out, 
it is implied that rights holders who do not comply with these obligations will 
lose the land under their possession. There are a variety of penalties for those 
who are found to engage in land sales or purchases, or land transfers not in 
conformity with the legislation. 
Similarly, the Amhara land administration and land use proclamation of 
2000 sets out a number of obligations that rights holders have to comply with as 
a condition of keeping the land in their possession. These include undertaking 
soil and water conservation measures, planting suitable tree species on or 
around their plots or caring for such trees that may already be on them, 
employing "proper" land management practices, constructing suitable flood 
control structures, and other land improvement measures. The legislation states 
clearly that holders who fail to carry out these obligations will lose their rights 
to the land. Neither the Tigrai nor the Amhara legislation specifies who 
determines whether the rights holder has failed to fulfil his/her obligations and 
how such determination is made. Neither legislation mentions bringing up the 
matter before a court of law. 
The Amhara proclamation states that land redistribution will not be 
undertaken in the future unless it is requested by the community, supported by 
research or found to have no deleterious impact on land productivity. However, 
if these conditions allow it, redistribution will be carried out in accordance with 
the law. Redistribution is thus not ruled out but the manner in which the 
decision is undertaken is now redefined. It should be pointed out that the 
controversial redistribution undertaken by the Killil in 1997 has left a legacy of 
suspicion and fear among a large number of Amhara peasants. All Killil 
legislations state that redistribution will be carried out on land brought under 
irrigation. 
In both Tigrai and Amhara Killil, peasants are allowed to lease their land 
on a short-term basis. The Tigrai proclamation of 1997 stipulates that the length 
of the lease period will depend on what kind of technology the lessee employs 
on the land. The lease period may extend up to ten years (20 years according to 
the 2002 regulation issued by the Killil) if the lessee employs "modern 
technology" but only up to two years if he/she employs "traditional 
technology". The document does not define what constitutes modern or 
traditional technology, nor what the lease period will be if the lessee employs a 
combination of both. No such distinction is made in the Amhara legislation 
which states that the lease period will be defined in future policy documents. A 
draft policy document issued recently (ANRS 2002: 20) now provides details on 
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this issue. If the lease period extends for over three years, the contracting parties 
are required to notify the woreda desk of EPLAUA. If however the period is for 
only "two crop seasons", the parties need only notify the kel elle administration 
and the kebelle EPLAUA committee. 
Investors who wish to get access to government-held land are required to 
sign lease contracts with the Killil governments, the duration of which ranges 
from 25 years in Amhara to 30 years in Oromia and 50 years in Tigrai. There 
are also a number of specific conditions that they have to meet in order to keep 
their contracts. These include using the land according to the original plans 
submitted by investors and approved by the Killil governments, proper care of 
the land, protection of wildlife, biodiversity and the environment, and setting 
aside some land for the planting of local tree species. All Killil legislations state 
that investors will be provided land only if it does not involve the displacement 
of peasant farmers. 
There are two other important factors that have added to tenure insecurity 
among landholders: the first is the absence of a clear justice system for settling 
land disputes, and the second the authority given to different government 
agencies to intervene in land matters. During the Imperial regime, the local 
courts were the only authority (outside traditional institutions) that had the 
competence to hear cases involving land disputes. The main criticism of these 
courts at the time was that they were thoroughly corrupt and almost invariably 
ruled against the poor and in favour of the rich and privileged. The Derg 
deprived these courts of the power to try land cases and vested such powers in 
the newly created Judicial Tribunals which were a part of Peasant Associations. 
All land matters at the kebelle level were brought before the Tribunals 
(Dessalegn 1984). The present government has abolished these Tribunals on the 
one hand but has established what are called Social Courts at the kebelle level 
on the other; these Courts are not expressly empowered to hear land cases 
which are now the competence of the regular woreda courts. To the average 
peasant, the woreda is too far away from his/her locality and taking one's case 
there is inconvenient, time-consuming and costly. 
What is equally problematic is that there are numerous government 
agencies and officials that have a say in land matters. The local Development 
Agent (DA), the kebelle council, and officials from the Offices of Agriculture, 
and of Land Administration and Land Use, each can make decisions that may 
threaten an individual household's rights and access to land. The package 
program, for example, which was launched in the mid-1990s and which 
consisted of the dissemination of modern inputs and new farm practices to 
farmers, was undertaken, in the initial stages, on a pilot basis, and local 
government agents were in charge of selecting the participants and running the 
program. Frequently, peasants who were reluctant to participate were forced to 
do so because of the threat of dispossession. Trials of new inputs, new farming 
techniques or new strains of poultry or dairy animals were undertaken in similar 
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fashion: reluctant peasants were pressured to be involved because of the threat 
of dispossession. The decision to alienate part or all the possession of an 
individual, and to allocate land to someone and not to another during 
redistribution, for example, was made by such administrative officials in 
Amhara and not by a court of law. Similarly, the power to expropriate someone 
for having failed to fulfil his/her obligations, or because he/she has been away 
from the locality for some time is given to the bureaucracy and not to the courts. 
Thus, in many aspects having to do with land at the local level, the rule of law is 
disregarded. This has given the bureaucracy immense power over the peasant. 
A third problem is that quite frequently officials at lower levels 
(particularly in the woreda and kebelle) are ignorant of the content of 
legislations and policies they are supposed to administer. Copies of such 
documents are rarely provided to the DA, the kebelle or woreda authorities, and 
neither are these officials adequately briefed about government decisions. Thus 
officials that have the closest contact with the peasant farmer interpret the law 
or government policy not according to what it actually says but what they think 
it does, and there is often a big gap between one and the other. For example, 
until quite recently, kebelle officials in some woredas in East Gojjam prohibited 
peasants from planting any tree species, on the grounds that this was 
government policy, but as we have seen above the Amhara land legislation 
prohibits only a few tree species (such as eucalyptus and cactus) but encourages 
rights holders to plant or care for all useful tree species. 
Both Oromia and the Southern Killil have now finalized legislation on land 
administration and land use. Let us look at each in turn. Comparatively 
speaking, of the four Killil legislations, the Oromia legislation is by far the best 
in many respects. It has attempted to address some of the deficiencies of the 
country's land policy and, if successfully implemented, may, in the long run, 
serve to remove some of the causes of tenure insecurity (ONRS 2002). 
In accordance with the Constitution and other Federal land policy, the 
Oromia legislation states that land cannot be sold, or exchanged in any way 
(Article 4.1). Article 5.1 states that any resident of the Killil, 18 years or older, 
who wishes to live by farming has the right to get access to land free of charge. 
This is unfortunate because it assumes that the Killil can deliver whenever any 
rightful person puts in his/her claim, and that there is plenty of land to 
distribute. As we shall see below, there is severe shortage of farmland in all 
parts of the country, and because of this, there is growing landlessness on the 
one hand, and farm plots are progressively getting smaller on the other. 
The legislation affirms that rights to holdings are for life, and that no one 
will be deprived of these rights under any circumstances, unless the land in 
question is needed for investment by the state for the public good, in which case 
the person will be compensated for all the investments on the land (Article 6). It 
prohibits future redistribution of land, except in cases involving land in 
irrigation schemes (Article 14.1). Unoccupied land or land which has no heirs 
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will be distributed to the landless and the poor, or rented by the government to 
investors. Rights to land will not be terminated if the holder leaves his/her 
kebelle and resides elsewhere (Article 15.5). As we shall see further down, 
among some of the factors that have exacerbated tenure insecurity are periodic 
redistribution on the one hand, and land rights tied to continuous residence in a 
kebelle on the other. Rights holders will be provided with certificates of tenure 
as a means to promote security of holding. Since men and women have equals 
rights to land, the family holding will be registered, and a certificate issued, in 
the name of both husband and wife. In case of divorce, the family plot will be 
divided equally between them (Articles 6, and 15.2). 
Rights holders are entitled to lease part of their land (up to half of their 
allotment) to others. The lease period will be up to three years if the lessee 
employs "traditional technology", or 15 years if he/she employs "modern 
technology". The legislation defines modern technology to mean 
mechanization, or the use of agrochemicals and improved seeds. Holders who 
are unable to personally cultivate their land are allowed to have it farmed for 
them by hired labor. 
Rights to land come with a number of conditionalities that the rights holder 
is obligated to comply with. Overall, the holder's obligations are similar to those 
found in the two legislations discussed above. Briefly, they include good 
management of the land, soil and water conservation, refraining from planting 
"harmful" vegetation, including eucalyptus and cactus, and care for what the 
document calls "mother trees" standing on farm plots. 
Of the four legislations, only the Oromia legislation expressly relies on the 
rule of law to resolve land conflicts or in the event punitive measures are 
contemplated (Article 25). Land disputes are adjudicated, in the first instance, 
by the kebelle Social Court, but if they are not resolved to the satisfaction of all 
the disputants concerned, they may be taken to the woreda court; appeals to a 
higher court is possible in the event of dissatisfaction with the decision at the 
woreda level. Moreover, rights holders found in breach of the provisions 
stipulated in the legislation are sued in accordance with existing civil or 
criminal law. 
The Oromia legislation provides many improvements on the other 
legislations, however, even if a concerted effort is made to inform the farming 
population about its content, it will take many years before land holders in the 
Killil will feel sufficiently secure about their entitlements. 
The legislation prepared by the Southern Killil in 2003 (which still has not 
been published in the Killil's legal gazette) is in many ways a cross between that 
of Amhara and Oromia. It has some of the weaknesses of the former but not 
many of the strengths of the latter (SNNPRS 2004). As in all the other 
legislations, the Killil's law states clearly that land belongs to the state and 
cannot be sold or mortgaged. 
Article 6 of the legislation provides that rights of access to land is open to 
7 
all the country's citizens aged 18 and above who wish to live by farming. 
However, the legislation does not expressly state that women have as much 
right to land as men. Customary law in many parts of the Killil prohibits women 
from holding land in their own right, and, in view of this, women's rights should 
have been expressly provided in the new law. Rights to land may be passed on 
to heirs or other members of the family either through inheritance or by gift. 
Rights holders will be issued a certificate of holding on which the names of 
both husband and wife will be recorded. In the event of divorce, rights held 
jointly will be divided between husband and wife, however, if the land is too 
small to be divided one party will have to forfeit their rights for which they will 
be compensated. Rights holders will not lose their rights if they leave the 
kebelle (ie change their place of residence), or in the event of death (Art. 8). 
Landholders have the right to rent out their holdings but only to those who 
are engaged or willing to be engaged in agricultural pursuits. The legislation 
states that the Killil will issue regulations in the future defining the terms and 
conditions of land rentals, in the meantime, however, all customary rental 
agreements or written contracts now in place are rendered null and void (Article 
V ) . 
Though it is stated early on (in sub-article 6.7) that rights holders are 
assured of security of tenure, there are provisions later in the legislation that 
contradict this. Rights holders may lose their holdings if they do not "properly 
manage" the land under their care and if this results in serious damage to the 
land, or if the holder leaves the land unused for a period of time to be 
determined by the authorities (Art. 9). What "proper management" of the land 
or "serious damage" means is not defined in the legislation. Holders will also 
lose their rights if there is fresh redistribution. Article 12 states that there will 
not be land redistribution in the future, but this is conditional: redistribution will 
be undertaken if it is requested by the community, if the need for it is supported 
by research and if it is found to have no deleterious effect on land productivity. 
The rights of holders are subject to a long list of obligations that they must 
comply with (Article 15). Failure to do so, and especially if such failure leads to 
"damage" to the land will have serious consequences, including the loss of 
rights. These obligations include planting or caring for local tree species and not 
planting species harmful to the soil, such as eucalyptus; undertaking or caring 
for soil conservation measures; protecting wildlife or biodiversity found on the 
land; refraining from cultivating plants prohibited by law (such as opiates), and 
others. Further, rights holders are required to improve the fertility and carrying 
capacity of the land by the use of appropriate technologies; this is seen as a 
means of addressing the problem of growing population pressure on the land 
(Art. 21). 
The legislation does not provide a proper judicial framework for the 
resolution of land disputes. There are several places in the legislation where 
reference is made to ensuring that measures taken by the authorities will be "in 
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accordance with" or "subject to" the law, but neither these laws, nor the 
adjudication framework are specified. Article 25 states that the Killil will issue 
regulations in the future governing the framework for handling land disputes. 
This is unfortunate because the resolution of disputes through an acceptable 
judicial system should have been a central element of the legislation. 
2.1.1 Common Features 
It may be important to note here several points in reference to all the Killil 
legislations discussed above. First is the fact that all the legislations except that 
of Tigrai (issued in 1989) were issued relatively recently; the legislation of the 
Southern Killil has not even been formally published. This means that the three 
legislations are not being fully or widely implemented. Secondly, as I argue 
later under section 7.1.2 below, few peasants if any, in the three Killils 
especially, are aware of the legislations and the rights and responsibilities they 
have as rights holders provided in them. It is not a common practice in this 
country to enable citizens concerned to have access to relevant legal documents 
so that they are aware of their rights and responsibilities. Indeed, keeping 
peasants in the dark has been a not infrequent tool employed by state agencies 
in order to exercise power over them. 
Thirdly, all Killil legislations encourage rights holders to consolidate their 
plots either on their own initiative or through the support of local authorities. 
However, farmland was provided to holders in several fragments to begin with-
because of the varying qualities of the land available in many kebelles. 
Moreover, there is immense population pressure, and new claimants can only be 
accommodated (either by local authorities or families) by subdividing existing 
plots. Due to high rates of population growth, farm plots are decreasing in size 
in all parts of the rural areas. At present, average holdings in many parts of the 
country measure less than a hectare, and the prospects are that these will 
become even smaller in the years ahead. On the other hand, peasants themselves 
frequently prefer plots in different locations or of different qualities for a variety 
of valid reasons. Thus, fragmentation, while not expressly favored by the land 
legislations, is built, perhaps willy-nilly, into the system. 
2.2 Women's Rights to Land 
I submit that while both Federal and Killil legislations have taken measures in 
the right direction, none of them provide a robust legal and institutional 
framework to advance the rights of rural women. There are nevertheless some 
provisions in all the legislations that have gender significance of which the 
following are the main ones. 
The fact that individuals rather than households are entitled to rights to 
land is of great advantage to peasant women. All the four legislations state that 
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every adult in the rural areas is entitled to land. In Amhara where land 
redistribution was undertaken in 1997, women got land in their own right 
(Yigremew 2001). During the Derg, land was allocated to households which 
meant that it was the head of the household (usually the husband) in whose 
name the land was registered in the Peasant Association. All the legislations 
discussed above clearly note that in case of divorce, women will be entitled to a 
share of the land held jointly by husband and wife. 
The legislations of Tigrai and Oromia expressly state that women will have 
rights to land on an equal basis with men, but, as noted above, this kind of 
provision is lacking in the legislation of the Southern Killil. In all Killils except 
Tigrai, the names of both husband and wife is (or will be) recorded in the user 
documents issued or to be issued to rights holders. In both the Oromia and 
Southern legislation, a husband with more than one wife will be allowed to 
claim documentation only with one wife. Though not expressly stated, female 
siblings are entitled to inherit land in all legislations. 
However, the issue of women moving from their kebelle to another kebelle 
upon marriage and the problem this may raise in terms of their rights to land is 
not adequately addressed in any of the legislations. Women will lose their right 
in Tigrai in the event of change of kebelle residence because rights to land is 
conditional on continued residence in one kebelle. In Oromia and Southern 
Killil, the legislations state that a husband, wife or family will not lose their 
rights to land in the event of change of residence. This would mean that on 
divorce a wife will retain her rights even though she may leave the kebelle of 
her husband. The Amhara legislation is somewhat ambiguous on this issue. The 
legislation says that rights to land are conditional on residence in the rural areas 
of the Killil and that the land given is to enable the person concerned to live by 
farming. It is not quite clear whether the wife will lose her rights to land in the 
event of divorce and her decision to live in the urban areas. 
2.3. Government Justification for Policy 
The government's justification for its land policy is grounded on what may be 
described as social equity. The Constitution and all other government 
documents pertaining to land declare that every rural individual has a right to a 
plot of land sufficient for his/her livelihood and should claim the right in his/her 
kebelle when he/she reaches the age of maturity. Since official development 
policy views agriculture as the dynamic force for achieving food security and 
promoting rapid economic growth, the right to live by farming is highly 
favored. The growing concentration of people in the rural areas in the face of 
ever decreasing resources and severe fragmentation of land is not seen as a 
major problem. 
Moreover, the government argues that private ownership will give rise to 
the following problems: a) large numbers of peasants will sell, heavily 
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mortgage or otherwise transfer their land rights to others and end up landless; b) 
this will give rise to a massive concentration of rural property in the hands of a 
few, in particular in the hands of the urban bourgeoisie; c) th^re will be large-
scale peasant evictions and widespread poverty. The recent rural development 
strategy document noted above adds another element to these fears. It argues 
that land concentration and widespread landlessness will give rise to wastage of 
capital and labour, though exactly how such wastage will occur is not clearly 
articulated. 
These arguments are based on unsubstantiated fears, and very little hard 
evidence is available to support them. There is no evidence here in this country, 
or elsewhere where peasant agriculture is prevalent, to show that in the absence 
of the restraining hand of the state peasants will readily sell their land at the first 
opportunity. Though flawed in many respects, the recent study by the Ethiopian 
Economic Association found that most peasants were not keen to sell their land 
if they were given the chance (EEA 2002; see also Dessalegn 1994). 
Another aspect of the equity principle is the expectation that state 
ownership will do away with the problem of landlessness. Since the initial land 
reform of the Derg in the mid-1970s, landlessness has become a problem of the 
young. Young people who were not old enough to benefit from the last 
redistribution end up landless when they become adults. The main instrument 
employed to deal with landlessness so far has been periodic redistribution. 
Other means include the expropriation of landholders who fail to meet the 
obligations specified in each Killil's land legislation and the distribution of their 
plots to the landless. A recent measure which has also been employed for the 
same purpose is the "privatisation" of hillsides. In both Amhara and Tigrai 
Killils, degraded hillside have been divided up and distributed to members of 
the surrounding community. This was originally an environmental rehabilitation 
measure but officials are now using it as a measure to tackle the problem of 
landlessness. However, under present circumstances, landlessness is a dynamic 
problem: each generation that comes of age is landless and demands rights to 
land, and the end result of accommodating its demands is increasing land 
fragmentation and the progressive levelling down of holdings. 
A third element of the equity principle is the promotion of social equality 
in rural society. State ownership, it is argued, will ensure that the gap between 
the rich and the poor is narrowed and that inequalities of wealth and property 
leading to social antagonism and class conflict will be minimized. True, the 
existing land system discourages rural differentiation based on land size. As a 
result of periodic redistribution and other measures imposed by the dictates of 
the land system, differences in land ownership among households is narrowing 
down. 
Equality of holdings is being achieved in a two-fold process: a) larger 
holders are losing some of their land through a process of unilateral levelling 
down; what is taken from them does not lift smaller holders up but goes to 
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benefit some of the landless; b) larger holders are losing some of their land and 
smaller holders are gaining as a result. The term "large" and "small" holder 
should be taken in its relative sense: compared to the situation in other African 
countries, the largest holder in Ethiopia would be a small holder elsewhere in 
the continent. The recent SDPRP document submitted by the government to the 
IMF and World Bank points to the growing equality in the rural areas as one of 
the success stories of government development policy (MOFED 2002). 
However, there is compelling evidence that the equality that is unfolding in the 
countryside is equality of poverty. 
3. Impact of Current Policy 
Let us first look briefly at three important issues that we argue flow from, or are 
significant consequences of, the current land system and have a bearing on the 
discussion in the last section of this study. First, tenure insecurity, second 
landlessness, and third agricultural productivity. 
3.1. Insecurity 
Since the land reform of the 1970s, peasants have been denied secure rights to 
land, and current policy has not improved the situation much. A central 
contradiction of the land system is that between equity and security. The 
promise of the right to land to all adults living in the rural areas that is made in 
the Constitution and the Killil legislations can only be fulfilled if the demands 
of new claimants are met, and this can only be done through periodic 
redistribution. But redistribution and the levelling down of holdings that it gives 
rise to, means that there is generalized insecurity and little incentive on the part 
of holders to invest on the land and to manage it properly. While, so far, there 
has been only one major redistribution, the Amhara redistribution of 1997, the 
threat of redistribution that hangs over peasants in many areas (or the lack of 
express assurance that redistribution will not occur) is just as damaging. 
Let us look briefly at some of the major consequences of tenure insecurity. 
Impact on farm practices. Tenure insecurity and the sub-division of plots 
has forced peasants to abandon sound traditional land management practices. 
Peasants are reluctant, for example, to employ crop rotation, organic forms of 
soil fertilization and other similar practices because they are uncertain if the 
land they have enriched in this way will remain theirs for long. Similarly, land 
fallowing, which was a common practice in the past, has virtually disappeared, 
and this has compounded the problem of livestock management. Farm plots are 
now cultivated continuously without rest or enrichment, leading to their 
exhaustion. 
Demographic impact. The land system has discouraged the movement of 
the rural population out of agriculture since rights to land are dependent on 
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residence in the kebelle. Peasants absent from their kebelle for an extended 
length of time will lose their rights to their allotment; they will also forfeit their 
land if they are not present at the time of redistribution. This may change now in 
Oromia and Southern Killil as their legislation does not tie rights to land with 
continued residence in the rural areas. Be that as it may, the countryside is 
carrying an enormous population, estimated to be 54 million in 2000, thus 
creating the conditions for a Malthusian disaster. Ethiopia is the least urbanized 
country in Africa, and since the 1980s rural to urban migration has not been a 
significant demographic factor. Migration has been caused by environmental 
disaster, war and civil conflict. Given the absence of improvements in farm 
technology and real productivity growth, the population trapped in the rural 
areas will be earning less, consuming less and becoming increasingly 
impoverished with each passing year. It will also exert immense pressure on 
available environmental resources leading to increased land degradation. 
Decreasing pastureland. In an attempt to accommodate the increasing 
population, peasant communities have had to parcel up and distribute grazing, 
land to newly formed households for farming purposes, resulting in severe 
shortage of pasture. Some communities have also had to abandon common 
grazing for individual grazing leading to tiny pasture plots for each household. 
Because of the shortage of pasture, many rural communities, especially in the 
northern highlands, can only support a very small livestock population, and this 
explains the highly skewed nature of livestock ownership in these areas. Some 
communities in fact have been putting greater emphasis on sheep and goats 
because there is not enough pasture to support cattle. 
Environmental impact. Tenure insecurity has discouraged peasants from 
planting trees, at least for purposes of domestic consumption, and thus peasants 
are almost exclusively dependent on state forests, community or open access 
woodlots for fuelwood and other wood products. This has put immense pressure 
on forestry schemes and on vegetation cover; it has also given rise to intense 
competition among local residents as well as among communities. 
The repertoire of indigenous environmental protection measures is quite 
extensive, and in the past these were frequently employed to protect the land 
from erosion. Terracing, bunding, and a variety of biological conservation 
measures were some of the practices commonly employed in many parts of the 
country. At present, however, peasants are reluctant to invest in conservation 
schemes for fear of losing the land. Tenure insecurity is also responsible for the 
unwillingness of peasants to plant trees except eucalyptus, which is popular in 
the countryside not because peasants are unaware of the damages caused by it 
but because of the prevailing insecurity. This tree, which is grown almost 
exclusively as a cash crop, grows fast, and can be harvested and marketed at any 
time after two to thr ee years' of growth. On the other hand, the shortage of land 
has forced kebelles to allocate marginal land, and land in fragile ecosystems for 
farming. Such land is soon exposed to environmental hazard. Land degradation 
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is thus a growing threat for both these reasons. 
Conflict management. Dynamic and enabling property systems contain 
sound institutions for the management of land and environmental resource 
conflicts. The initial reform legislation recognized this and created what were 
known as judicial tribunals within each Peasant Association and later at higher 
levels. The main responsibility of the tribunals was to adjudicate land disputes. 
However, the tribunals soon lost their legitimacy, but no comparable institution 
replaced them. At present, land disputes and conflicts arising out of rights to 
land resources are dealt with in the main not only through the woreda courts but 
also through administrative and political decisions. This has exacerbated 
insecurity and uncertainty. 
Impact on credit services. Because the ultimate owner of the land is the 
state and the peasant has only use rights over his/her allotment, the banks do not 
accept land as collateral. Access to institutional credit is thus not open to 
peasants. While few peasants have used the banks as sources of credit even in 
the past, land reform and the present tenure system have made it difficult to 
promote credit programmes as a development strategy other than micro-finance 
schemes. 
Impact on technology improvement. The continual division and sub-
division of the land has precluded the widespread dissemination of improved 
technologies. Insecure micro-holders have little incentive in trying out new 
techniques and will be reluctant to take the risks that frequently accompany 
innovative productive methods. At present the demand for fertilizers, though 
increasing, is quite modest, and with rising prices and delivery difficulties 
demand will either stagnate or decrease after a short while. 
Social impact. The land system places the rural young in a disadvantaged 
position. There is virtually no land available for peasants who come of age after 
land distribution, and such peasants are thus left landless and dependent on their 
parents. The young come to see themselves as the "have-nots" and resent their 
parents whom they see as the "haves". This generational cleavage is creating 
conflict and tension among households and communities. On the other hand, the 
system has arrested social differentiation, and there are now very limited 
opportunities for the emergence of a vigorous and entrepreneurial peasantry. 
Since the state controls the ultimate rights to land, and the land-user is in 
constant fear of losing his/her allotment, it has made it easier for the former to 
reinforce its control over the latter. 
3.2. Landlessness 
As noted above, the land system is demographic sensitive. Since every adult 
residing in the rural areas has a right to a plot of land sufficient for his/her 
livelihood, the demand for land by new claimants is a never-ending burden on 
the state. Moreover, the issue becomes complex when seen against a 
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background of diminishing rural assets caused both by population pressure as 
well as by massive levels of natural resource degradation. The country's arable 
land, and land that can be cultivated using the technology accessible to the 
peasant producer is highly limited. There is a large population trapped in the 
rural areas partly because of the land system and partly because of the inability 
of the non-agricultural economy to create employment. The rural population has 
grown from an estimated 15 million in the early 1950s, to 34 million in 1980 
and 54 million in 2000. In contrast, there has been no comparable expansion of 
the size of arable land in the country (Dessalegn 2003a). 
The available evidence suggests that average per capita holdings have been 
diminishing over the last four decades due to population pressure and the 
increasing inability of the non-farm sector to provide employment to the excess 
rural population (Dessalegn 2003a). CSA data show that the average per capita 
holding for the country as a whole is at present less than one hectare. The recent 
land and agricultural survey published by the EEA (2002) reaches similar 
conclusions. In some of the more densely populated areas a peasant with half a 
hectare of land is considered fortunate. Such is the demand for land every year 
that in Wollo, north Shewa and other areas in the North, kebelle officials have 
divided up pastureland for distribution to new claimants. It will not be hard to 
imagine how this has impacted on livestock raising in rural communities. 
Landlessness is thus a dynamic problem fuelled first and foremost by 
demographic factors. There has not be a serious attempt to determine the extent 
of landlessness in the country as a whole, though there have been some findings 
from a few case studies. Gavian and Amare (1996) found in one woreda in Arsi 
that 17 percent of households were landless. An ILRI study points out that close 
to 50 percent of the population is landless in some localities of Oromia 
(Bezuayehu et al 2000). According to a recent sample survey in Wag Hamra, 
North and South Wollo by IDS (2002), the landless population was only 7 
percent of the sample population. Degefa's research in three PAs in Munessa 
woreda in Arsi found that landlessness ranged between 44 and 53 percent 
(Degefa 2003). Workneh's land tenure study in three PAs in a woreda in the Rift 
Valley (Oromia) found that landless households constituted 36 percent of total 
households (Workneh 2002). 
Landlessness has also been exacerbated by the collapse of the Derg's 
resettlement program, by refugee returnees, and the demobilization of soldiers 
after the civil war. Table 1 below shows the number and type of returned 
populations in the country at the end of the 1990s. 
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Table 1 Number and Type of Returnees 
Type of Returnees Number Percent 
Refugee Returnees 1,081,500 53 
Demobilized Soldiers 377,500 18 
From Ethnic Conflict 328,000 16 
From Resettlement 253,000 12 
Total 2,048,710 100 
Source: Pankhurst 2001 
Note: The refugee figures include 200,000 returnees from Eritrea and Asseb before the 
war; no figures from the recent Ethio-Eritrean war. 
The refugee returnees to the northern highlands of the country were people 
who had fled to the Sudan during the war, a majority of whom were from 
Tigrai. The authorities there have attempted to reintegrate some of them into 
the communities from where they had original fled, and to settle the others in 
the Setit lowlands adjoining the Sudan (Kassahun 2000). When peasants were 
taken to resettlement, their land was confiscated by the Peasant Association to 
be used for distribution to young claimants and landless people. Upon their 
return, many settlers found that their land was allocated to others and the PA 
had very little land to distribute. Settlers returned to their homes in increasing 
waves, and the figures in Table 1 above shows only the volume of returnees in 
the post-Derg period. In Wollo in particular, many of the landless today are 
returnees from resettlement. Demobilized soldiers faced similar problems. 
Soldiers who were originally from the rural areas were told to return to their 
communities with a vague promise that they would be offered land for a living. 
When the soldiers did return to their communities the kebelles were unable to 
provide land or employment opportunities to most of them. 
Finally, landlessness may have been made worse, though the evidence is 
patchy, by the promise given to all rural residents by the land legislations. As 
noted above, both the Federal and Killil legislations entitle every adult in the 
rural areas that he/she has a right to land. This promise may be one reason why 
the landless continue to stay in the rural areas. In a number of rural areas, many 
peasants expect redistribution to take place in the near future (Ege, EEA). In 
some areas, the promise of fresh redistribution is raised by local authorities 
from time to time to win votes and political support. This is especially so in 
those kebelles where the leadership is predominantly young (Teferi 1995). On 
the other hand, the cities are not viewed as attractive to the landless and the 
rural unemployed because the prospects of employment are limited and urban 
residents, especially the unemployed here, are resentful of rural migrants 
(Dessalegn and Aklulu 2002). 
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3.3. Agricultural Productivity 
There has not been a serious attempt to study the impact of the land policy on 
agricultural productivity. This is partly because it is a difficult undertaking since 
such a study will have to look at the problem over a sufficient period of time. 
Moreover, it will not be easy to isolate the land tenure factor from the many 
other factors that have a bearing on agricultural productivity (environmental 
factors, farm practices, soil conditions, labour input, etc.) and examine its 
impact. There have be'en some case studies undertaken within one or two 
harvest periods looking into the relative efficiency of various forms of land 
contracts, but these are not sufficiently broad enough and robust enough to 
allow one to make definitive conclusions4. 
Despite these constraints, however, it is possible to examine the issue and 
make a number of conclusions based on the available evidence. Productivity 
decline .is a fact, but the extent to which this decline has been caused or 
aggravated by land policy is not accurately known. It is however safe to say that 
insecurity does have a damaging impact on land productivity for the reasons 
noted above. There is also evidence from elsewhere that tenure security is an 
important factor, though not the only one, in improved agricultural performance 
and higher productivity (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994: Ch. 2). 
CSO/CSA has conducted annual agricultural surveys (which include 
agricultural productivity measures) since at least the last quarter of the 1970s. In 
a recent work, I examined the productivity data over a period of twenty years, 
from 1980/81 to 2000/01 (Dessalegn 2003a). Productivity in all CSO/CSA 
surveys refers to crop yield and does not measure labour productivity. The data 
shows that in the two decades in question productivity performance was very 
poor. Average crop yield in the decade of the 1980s was 11.1 quintals per 
hectare while in the 1990s the comparable figure was 10.3. The highest yield 
achieved was 12.8 qn per ha in 1982/83 and 12.5 qn per ha in 1988/89, both 
during the Derg. These figures have not been equalled in the decade of the 
1990s. This is remarkable because much more fertilizer and improved seeds 
were distributed in the 1990s than during the Derg. The best yield under the 
current agricultural strategy was achieved in 1996/97 when productivity reached 
11.7 qn per ha. (see Annex 2 at the end of this study). 
One ILRI study argues that the recent "land redistribution in Amhara has 
had a positive impact on land productivity" (Benin and Pender 2002: 19). This 
is unconvincing and is not supported by the available evidence. CSA data on 
Amhara Killil for the years 1994/95 to 2000/01 indicate that productivity fell 
after the redistribution. The best crop yield in the Killil was in the 1996/97 
harvest year, just before the redistribution. Productivity fell immediately 
following the redistribution and has not equalled the level achieved in that year 
4 Amare 1998; Gavian and Amare; Gavian and Ehui 1996; Ahmed et al. 2002; Degefa 2003 
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(see Dessalegn 2003a for the CSA references). 
Admittedly, the poor performance of agriculture and the stagnation of farm 
productivity cannot wholly be attributed to land policy, but since tenure is a 
critical factor in this country and since tenure insecurity is widespread and deep-
seated, land policy must bear a high proportion of the blame. 
There is considerable consensus that per capita food production has been 
declining since at least the 1970s, if not earlier. In this same work noted above, I 
show that on the basis of annual data provided by RRC/DPPC, the government's 
emergency management agency, the vulnerable population has grown 
appreciably in the last two decades. The vulnerable population averaged 4.2 
million per annum in the decade of the 1980s and 5.3 million in the 1990s. In 
2003, the vulnerable population reached over 14 million. Here again it may be 
difficult to unbundle the factors responsible for the decline of food security, but 
the evidence points strongly to tenure insecurity as one of the most significant 
causal factors. 
4. New Policy Initiatives 
In response to widespread criticism and pressure from several quarters, the 
government has initiated new policy measures to address a number of problems 
including that of tenure insecurity and land scarcity. We shall look at two of 
these in some detail below, namely land user documentation (or user 
certification) and resettlement. 
All the recent legislations issued by the Killils state that rights holders will 
be issued documentation as an assurance of their rights and as a means to 
promote tenure security. So far, only Tigrai and Amhara have started issuing 
such documents, the former beginning in 1999 while the latter only very 
recently. It is too early to judge the longterm impact of these measures, but it 
should be noted that holding documentation is being undertaken within the 
framework of existing legislation. 
4.1. User Right Documentation 
The user documents in question that are now being issued are known as holding 
certificates in Tigrai, and books of holding in Amhara. In both these cases, the 
documents in question are, properly speaking, documents of user rights and not 
of ownership rights. The certificate in Tigrai consists of a piece of paper on 
which basic information pertaining to the holder and the plots that he/she has a 
right to are recorded. The book of holding on the other hand resembles a bank 
book with twenty pages containing forms to be filled out as required. The book 
is divided into two sections: section one for first stage certification and section 
two for second stage certification. 
In both Killils, the document contains information on the plots of each 
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holder and what they are currently being used for. Plot measurements are shown 
in local units and the boundaries are described according to customary practices. 
In both instances, the process of plot identification has been undertaken by the 
local authorities with support from the local population. The main actors have 
been the local office of EPLAUA, elected peasant committees and the kebelle 
administration. 
Tigrai 
The Tigrai certificate is issued in the name of the household head only, and the 
name of the spouse does not appear in this or related documents. The 
information contained in the certificate is recorder in a register at the local 
kebelle office (or tabia as they are known here). According to the Manager of 
the Killil's EPLAUA interviewed for this study, many peasant households have 
already been issued the certificate but the task is not yet over. While the 
objective in the long run is to have a proper cadastral survey, accurate maps and 
to issue suitable user documents, this has not been possible at present because 
of the high cost involved. He noted that the certificate was a temporary 
document and that it will be replaced with proper documentation once the 
survey and mapping exercise has been finalized. 
Both the Manager and others who were also interviewed for this study 
stressed that the importance of the certificate was to reassure rights holders and 
promote tenure security. They were also of the opinion that there are fewer 
disputes now than before and they attributed that to the issuance of the 
certificates. The Manager emphasised that the certificate will not be of much 
use if the owner wishes to use it to obtain credit services from financial 
institutions because the Constitution and other Federal legislation do not allow 
the selling or purchase of rural land. In other words, the certificate cannot be 
used as collateral since the holder do not have rights to the land and the banks 
cannot sell his/her property to recover their loan in case of default. But the 
certificate can be passed on to one's heirs. 
Amhara 
The process of documentation in Amhara Killil is somewhat different from that 
in Tigrai. The officials here envisage documentation to take place in three 
phases. In the first phase, holders will be issued temporary certificates- this is 
because the Killil has not been able to get sufficient copies of the book printed 
in time for distribution. The temporary document will be replaced as the books 
are available. In this stage, plot identification and measurement will be based on 
customary practices and registration will be undertaken in the local office of the 
kebelle. The Land Administration Committees in each community, elected by 
the population, are responsible for plot identification, demarcation, and 
measurement; registration is being undertaken by the woreda desk of EPLAUA. 
In many localities, plot boundary demarcation has been undertaken using stones 
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as boundary markers. The final stage will involve modern techniques of 
surveying, mapping and proper registration. 
Documentation is being undertaken at present in a number of woredas. 
Currently, topographical mapping is being attempted in two pilot woredas 
where the books of holding are also being distributed. These woredas are part of 
the Swedish supported rural development program run by the Killil. There is 
another pilot woreda supported by USAID where a different approach is being 
attempted. The head of EPLAUA in Bahr Dar informed the study team that the 
USAID initiative is being undertaken independently of the other pilot scheme 
but he had no information on how USAID was running the scheme. He went on 
to state that the number of people issued with documentation in the Killil as a 
whole is growing rapidly. 
The Amhara document is also different from that of Tigrai in that the 
names of both husband and wife are recorded in each book; the photographs of 
each person is also attached. The book contains the rights and obligations of 
each holder and the benefits of the document, one of which is stated to be the 
right to obtain loans from financial institutions using the document as collateral. 
However, a careful reading shows that what is offered as collateral is not the 
land itself but the investment and produce on the land. Many peasants 
interviewed for this study were of the opinion that the document will entitle 
them to credit services from the banks but this clearly is not the case. Local 
Commercial Bank officials interviewed in Bahr Dar were quite sceptical about 
the usefulness of the document for credit purposes since land was state property 
and cannot be sold. The right to pass on the land to one's heirs and to rent it out 
subject to the conditions laid down in the legislation is assured. In the event the 
land is passed on, the person who inherits it has to have the book updated, 
which involves recording the name(s) of the new holder and the condition of the 
plots (i.e. whether the original condition of the plots has been changed by sub-
division, etc.). 
As noted above, documentation does not change the legislation and policy 
framework governing rights of access to land that we have discussed earlier. 
Thus, user documentation does not entitle the holder to any more rights or 
benefits than those already included in existing legislation and policy. In so far 
as micro-credit institutions are concerned, documentation was not of particular 
importance to their programs because they do not require collateral since they 
employ the group-lending approach to distribute loans to their customers. 
However, both Killil officials and the majority of peasants interviewed 
were of the opinion that documentation will promote tenure security. Holders 
will be able to develop a sense of ownership and will be reassured that they will 
not lose their plots in the future. Both here and in Tigrai, documentation will 
also discourage future redistribution because that will undo all the work of plot 
identification, demarcation and measurement, and make the records compiled 
for the purpose virtually worthless. Many peasants interviewed were optimistic 
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that documentation will decrease land disputes, especially when plot boundaries 
are finally established by means of proper mapping. 
These developments are to be welcomed because they are an improvement 
on existing conditions and a step in the right direction. However, because of the 
way documentation was undertaken, ie. in the absence of proper cadastral 
surveys, and durable plot demarcation, new disputes are bound to arise5. 
Already, in both Killils, the inclusion or exclusion of grazing land, commons, 
and land used for rural service facilities (schools, health posts, etc) has 
generated new disputes. Moreover, the exclusion of the names of spouses, 
especially wives, from the certificates given out in Tigrai has created discontent 
among women groups which fear that women will risk being dispossessed 
unless the system is changed. 
4.1.1 Limitations Associated with Documentation 
• It was noted above that there are discrepancies among Killil 
legislations, and between Killil legislation on the one hand and Federal 
legislation on the other. These discrepancies have to do with issues of 
future redistribution, continued residence in a kebelle as a condition of 
rights to land, and land transfers, in particular land renting and the 
incentives for investors. There is therefore a need for harmonization of 
policies and practices pertaining to these. 
• The interpretation of the legislation, both Federal and Killil, regarding 
long-term land transfer, especially selling, needs to be re-examined. The 
distinction between the sale of the land and the sale of one's rights 
over it (i.e. rights of access and use) has not always been sufficiently 
appreciated by government authorities at both levels. There is therefore 
a need for serious debate on the matter. 
• As noted above, documentation is being undertaken without proper 
surveying and mapping being undertaken (except on a pilot basis in a 
few localities in Amhara). The problems this will create in the long run 
are obvious: new disputes will arise having to do with disagreements on 
plot boundaries, demarcation and measurement; registration of plots 
will be imprecise; and the information on the documents issued will 
likewise be unreliable. A policy initiative on this issue defining the 
modalities and standards of surveying and mapping, and the authority 
responsible for such tasks should be in place before any large-scale 
surveying is attempted. Plot measurements and demarcation are being 
5 Cadastral survey and registration is a costly undertaking. According to Raisin, USAID spent 13 
million US dollars to survey and register all the land on the tiny Caribbean island of St Lucia 
(pop. 35,000), which is about one-third the size of the average woreda in the highlands. 
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undertaken in most areas using traditional methods but such methods 
are imprecise and will give rise to discontent and disputes. 
• A modern system of land registration, and together with that a unit 
responsible for such registration, which is now absent in all the Killils, 
is also necessary. The absence of a proper system of registration will 
fuel land disputes in the long run. 
• Land document cannot be successful without a credible and effective 
system of adjudication of land disputes, which is now absent. Such a 
system will be acceptable if it is close to peasant communities and will 
not involve high costs and long absences from the work place. There 
must be a policy measure to set up such system and to empower it as 
the sole authority over all cases having to do with disputes over land as 
well as violations by government authorities of the rights of 
landholders, with or without documentation. 
• Finally, user documentation is being issued within the framework of 
existing legislation, which among other things, gives local authorities 
the right to interfere in matters of land and rights of access to it. 
4.2. Resettlement 
The government's program of rural resettlement has been under way since the 
beginning of 2003, and, according to recent figures, some 300,000 people have 
already been moved to various locations in Amhara, Oromia, Tigrai and 
Southern Killils. In the course of three years, the program plans to settle 
440,000 households or about 2.2 million people at an estimated cost of 217 
million US dollars or 1.9 billion Birr. This is a massive program by any 
standard: it will constitute the largest relocation of population in this country 
and will compare with the gigantic settlement programs currently underway in 
India and China arising from large-scale construction of dams and reservoirs. 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the program in terms of population and cost 
by the participating Killils. 
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Table 2 Settlement Areas, Population and Cost 
Killil Settlement Site No of people 
No of 
Hhds 
Cost in Mn 
Birr 
Tigrai: Humera 200,000 40,000 141 
Amhara: N. Gonder, Tsegede, 
Metema, Quara, 
TachArmachiho 
1,000,000 200,000 701 
Oromia: W. and E. Wollega, 
Illubabor, Jimma 
500,000 100,000 347 
SNNPR: Sheka, Kefa, 
Benchmaji, Dawro, Konta. S. 
Omo 
500,000 100,000 352 
Total 2,200,000 440,000 1541* 
Source: NCFSE 2003, Vol. II: 29; 22-25 
Note: *The figure does not include 328 million Birr which is the cost of drugs and 
institutional capacity, warehouse and other costs, administration and contingency. The 
total is thus 1869 million Birr 
The settlement program is viewed by the government as a lasting solution 
to chronic hunger and food insecurity on the one hand, and a way to meet the 
problem of land scarcity on the other. The program, it is argued, will provide 
people in the vulnerable areas, who at present do not have sufficient land to 
grow enough to feed themselves, "access to improved land" in areas within their 
own Killil where there is "considerable amounts of land currently under-
utilized" and "suitable for farm activities". In a press statement issued in early 
January 2004, the government claimed that the settlement program was already 
showing encouraging results, and that settlers have been successful in achieving 
food self-sufficiency in the first year of the program. The statement did not 
provide any evidence to support this remarkable claim. 
Is large-scale resettlement a viable option and will it lead to food security 
or better "access to improved land" for millions of people as the government 
maintains? Will it contribute to tenure security in the long run? Is the program a 
wise choice and a sound investment? These are fundamental questions that have 
not been sufficiently debated in this country. I for one do not believe that the 
government or its backers have offered sufficient credible evidence to answer 
these questions in the affirmative. The international resettlement experience is 
littered with failed programs, massive levels of resource loss, communal 
conflict and human suffering. The NCFSE document recognizes this, noting 
that most resettlement programs in developing countries and elsewhere "have 
failed, often spectacularly" (:3). 
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This country has a resettlement experience going back to the 1960s under 
the Imperial regime when, through a combination of spontaneous and planned 
settlement programs, a relatively small number of northern peasants were 
settled in western Ethiopia and the Rift Valley areas. Planned settlement during 
the Derg began in the latter part of the 1970s but became a major undertaking in 
the 1980s especially after the disastrous famine that occurred in the middle of 
that decade6. Resettlement under the Derg was meant to relieve the population 
pressure of the vulnerable areas and bring about the environmental 
rehabilitation of these areas on the one hand, and, on the other, to promote food 
security. But resettlement also formed part of the Derg's policy of agricultural 
socialisation. In the period 1984-86, the Derg resettled some 600,000 people 
mostly in the lowlands of western Ethiopia. In this same period, some 33,000 
settlers lost their lives due to disease, hunger, and exhaustion, and thousands of 
families were broken up. It is estimated that close to half a billion Birr was 
spent on emergency resettlement, but the cost of the damage caused to the 
environment, of the loss of livestock and other property, or of the distress and 
suffering it caused to numerous people and communities will never be known. 
There were two types of settlement schemes: "conventional" schemes, 
which were large-scale and based on collectivization and mechanized 
agriculture, and "integrated" schemes, which were small-scale and located on 
land owned by Peasant Associations. The majority of settlers were from Wollo, 
North Shewa and Tigrai; there was also a sizable population from Kembatta and 
northern Gojjam (Dessalegn 2003b; Alemneh 1990; Pankhurst 1992). Derg 
officials were convinced that there was plenty of unused arable land in many 
parts of the country, especially in the southwest to accommodate large numbers 
of settlers. In the end, this proved unfounded, and the settlement schemes were 
undertaken for the most part in dry or semi-dry areas which proved to be 
unsuitable to ox-plough farming and posed serious health hazards to both 
highland farmers and their livestock. Moreover, the settlement program was 
undertaken without the consent of the settlers themselves. 
The program involved considerable environmental damage. Large areas 
were cleared of their vegetation to build homesteads, to acquire farmland and to 
construct access roads. Resettlement in particular failed to recognize the rights 
of local people or the carrying capacity of the areas of settlement. It created 
conflict between the host population and settlers. It also failed to adapt farming 
practices to the agro-ecological conditions of the lowlands, and as a 
consequence, the environmental damage involved was quite considerable. 
Moreover, one of the objectives of resettlement was to reduce the population 
pressure of the highlands and thereby to control natural resource degradation. In 
the end, resettlement had no or limited impact on population pressure or land 
6 For a review of the resettlement experience in the country, see Dessalegn 2003b, Kassahun 
2000, A. Pankhurst 1992. 
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rehabilitation. On the contrary, it created population pressure and an extensive 
process of degradation in the host areas (Wolde-Selassie 2002). As resettlement 
was undertaken without the consent of the population involved, the program 
was unstable from the very beginning. Many settlers abandoned the schemes 
and returned to their home areas all through the 1980s. The fall of the Derg 
prompted a large number of settlers to trek back home, although some of them 
subsequently returned to the settlement schemes of their own free will 
(Pankhurst 2001). 
The Settlement Program 
Until recently, the present government was opposed to large-scale resettlement 
except in cases involving refugees returning to the country after the end of the 
civil war. Resettlement as repatriation of returnees was undertaken in the 
Humera area through the support of UNHCR and WFP in the 1990s involving 
some 2,500 Tigrian peasant households (Kassahun 2000). By the end of the 
1990s, however, and as the depth and magnitude of the country's food crisis 
came finally to be recognized by decision-makers, there began to appear a 
policy shift towards large-scale state-sponsored resettlement as a solution to 
food insecurity. The government's rural development policy document issued 
recently calls for planned resettlement programs within each Killil involving 
peasant populations living in highly vulnerable or drought prone areas (FDRE 
2001: 116-123). Such a program, the document insists, must be based on 
voluntary participation and the full consent of the beneficiaries concerned. It 
criticizes the Derg's resettlement program of the 1980s, arguing that the main 
reason for its failure was because it was based on coercion and not on consent. 
Planned resettlement is expected to relocate a sizeable portion of the population 
from vulnerable areas to areas within the same Killil where there is sufficient 
rainfall and arable land. 
The NCFSE document has now carried the argument a step further and 
issued a program for large-scale "voluntary resettlement". The main "pillars" of 
the program consist of the following: a) resettlement will be based on voluntary 
participation; b) it will involve moving people from their current homes to areas 
within the same Killil where there is sufficient "underutilized" land suitable for 
peasant agriculture; c) settlers are expected to be self-sufficient in food after the 
first harvest; d) settlers can return to their original homeland if they are unhappy 
about the conditions in the settlement sites; e) settlers will lose their rights to 
their land in their original homes if they do not return before three years; f) the 
settlement package offered by the government includes: 2 ha of "standard 
quality" land for each household (more if the quality is below standard), food 
rations for the first year, small farms tools, credit for the purchase of oxen, and 
basic services such as clean water, health and education (NCFSE 2003b: Ch. 
III). 
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One of the central arguments of the NCFSE and government authorities 
justifying large;scale resettlement is based on the assumption that there is 
abundant unutilized land suitable for peasant agriculture to support a large 
settler population within each Killil. The document under discussion mentions a 
"current regional survey" according to which "the total hectarage available [for 
settlement] is about one million: in Amhara 500,000, Tigrai 130,000, Oromia 
250,000, and SNNPR 100,000" (:6). No reference is cited to support this claim. 
It is interesting to note that when the Derg's resettlement program was launched 
a similar claim was made but not backed by any credible evidence. Common 
sense suggests that if either the Derg's or present government's claim was true, 
if indeed there was abundant unused land, hard-pressed peasants would have 
brought it under cultivation long before any of these governments had come to 
power. This was the tragedy of the Derg's program: it was planned on the 
erroneous assumption that there was abundant unused land suitable for highland 
settlers in many parts of the country. 
Another overly optimistic vision of planned resettlement is the belief that 
such a program will and should enable settlers to be self-sufficient within a very 
short period of time. Settlers are expected to achieve not only food self-
sufficiency in one harvest year but also produce a marketed surplus in a short 
time. Such unrealistic goals can only have been set by public authorities with 
little understanding of settlement programs, and with even less knowledge of 
the international experience. Settling people is a complex undertaking, and it 
takes careful planning, skilled personnel, many years of hard work and 
considerable resources to achieve success. 
A third element stressed by the NCFSE document is the voluntary nature 
of the program. Settlers, the document insists, will decide to resettle voluntarily 
after being provided full and active information about the program. All 
"activities in the program ... will be carried out in a transparent way" (:7). What 
exactly is meant by voluntarism? If the program was indeed meant to be based 
on the voluntary consent of the would-be settlers why was it launched when 
over 20 percent of the rural population, and almost all of the potential settlers 
were suffering hunger and starvation? A desperate person will be open to any 
option that will save him or her from immediate death. 
It may be worth looking at the differences and similarities of the settlement 
programs of the Derg and present government. First the differences. Unlike the 
Derg's, current policy expects resettlement to be undertaken within each Killil; 
settlement across Killils is considered to be risky and liable to give rise to inter-
community conflict. In contrast, the Derg relocated large populations in distant 
areas, across today's Killil boundaries. Secondly, current policy insists that 
resettlement must be based on the voluntary participation of the beneficiaries. 
Thirdly, the Derg's program expected settlers to be self supporting within two to 
three years irrespective of their location while the current program is planned on 
the assumption that self-sufficiency will be achieved within one harvest year. 
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Finally, the Derg's emergency resettlement program settled a total of 600,000 
people within a period of three years while this government is planning to 
relocate 2.2 million people in the same time frame. 
There are, however, more similarities than differences in the two 
programs. The similarities are: a) in both cases, planned (i.e. government 
sponsored) resettlement is preferred to individual-inspired spontaneous 
settlement. Current policy is strongly opposed to the latter kind of program, b) 
Both programs were predicated on the assumption that there is abundant land 
available (within each Killil in the case of the present government, in southern 
and western Ethiopia in the case of the Derg) for large-scale settlement 
programs, c) In both cases, resettlement was employed as a strategy to achieve 
food security, to relieve the population pressure in the vulnerable areas, and to 
promote environmental rehabilitation of these areas (see MOFED: 56). d) Many 
of the areas identified for settlement programs at present are largely those that 
were employed for the same purpose by the Derg in the 1980s. e) In both cases, 
resettlement was undertaken with haste and without adequate preparation 
It is too early to assess the current settlement program, partly because 
settler relocation was initiated very recently, and partly because there is very 
little information, at least in the public domain, about the execution and 
progress of the program. According to press reports, the relocation of settlers 
has been underway in all of the four Killils for some time, with the first round of 
relocation having been undertaken from January to August 2003, and the second 
round launched in November 2003 and continuing at present. The government 
has indicated that by mid-2004 a million people will be relocated. 
There are disturbing reports emerging from NGOs, donor agencies and 
international organizations7 that the settlement program has been launched in 
haste and without adequate preparation, that it is not exactly voluntary, that 
peasants have been given false promises to entice them to register for 
settlement, and that settlers are experiencing serious hardships due to lack of 
basic services such as health and clean water. Many of the settlement sites do 
not receive adequate rainfall, and others contain residents who have been on 
food aid for quite some time. In some settlement sites the food aid distributed 
has been insufficient. The reports also suggest that local authorities in the 
sending as well as the receiving woredas have been economical with the facts. 
Peasants, in other words, have not been told the whole truth: that for instance 
they will lose the land in their home areas, that oxen will be given to them on 
credit, or that the areas where they are going are infested with malaria. Here is 
one example taken from a report of a field trip to resettlement sites in Oromia: 
7 See reports from UN OCHA and UN EUE; the World Bank; EECMY-Norwegian Church Aid-
Christian Aid; and Benchmaji Zone, SNNPR. 
For a number of reasons, many settlers were deceived by the sending 
woredas. Settlers from Arsi were told not to carry any household 
utensils, hand tools, or even clothing. They were promised that these 
would be supplied to them at their destinations, along with keys to their 
new houses. Tap water, health and school facilities were also promised 
to the new settlers. None of this was true, and many settlers we spoke to 
felt deceived. (World Bank 2003) 
Government press reports8 about conditions in the settlement sites are also 
not very encouraging. According to these reports, many of the settlers have 
been transported from as far away as 1,000 kms or more from their homes. For 
example, peasants from east Harraghe and Bale have been relocated in Wollega; 
those from Wollo have been settled in Mettema and Armacheho. This means 
that settlers have very little chance of travelling to and from their home areas to 
visit relatives, friends and families. An important factor in settlement success is 
the ability of settlers to maintain their links with their original homes, but this 
seems to have been ignored in many qases here. 
It is evident that settlers are not being provided sufficient access to such 
basic necessities as land, farm oxen, water and health services. Many were 
encouraged to be relocated without their families and without taking basic 
household utensils. In a number of program sites, each household was given * 
only one hectare of farmland. It appears that the distribution was based on the 
amount of land available for distribution in the settler sites and how much of it 
can be distributed to settlers without antagonising the settler community. Many 
of the settler sites are located on or near pastoralist or semi-pastoralist 
communities and the land in question is employed for grazing. While not 
expressly stated, settlers rights to land will be governed by the same legislation 
in force in the Killil in question, including the issuance of user right 
documentation. 
The settlement document states that one of the reasons why peasants were 
relocated in the first place was the shortage of land due to population pressure. 
However, it does appear that settlement has not solved the problem of shortage. 
The document also states that settlers will be allowed to keep their land in their 
home areas only for three years after which it will be alienated by the local 
authorities for distribution to others. This is a disturbing measure because it will 
create insecurity among the settler population. 
Oxen have been distributed to settlers on long term credit however it is 
clear from the press reports that there is severe shortage of this most important 
asset. In a number of program sites, only one ox per household has been 
distributed, while in several others the figure is one ox for two households. 
8 The discussion that follows is based on Addis Zemen (government Amharic daily), from Ginbot 
to Nehassie 1995 EC (May 21 to September 2003 GC). 
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There are some settlers who have not received any farm animals at all. 
By all accounts, most of the settlement areas pose serious health risks to 
highland settlers. At the moment, settlement administrators are distributing 
mosquito nets but there are not sufficient quantities of these to go around. 
Health services and clean water facilities have been built in a few sites only, 
which means that many settlers will face serious health risks the moment they 
arrive. MSF-Holland, an NGO working in Armacheho in northern Amhara 
recently warned that death rates among children in resettlement here have 
reached "catastrophic levels" and that high mortality among adults is occurring 
due to malnutrition and also to new diseases to which settlers are not immune 
(IRIN News, 27 Nov 2003). 
There are reports that a good number of settlers are unhappy about 
conditions and that they are eager to return to their home areas. Evidence of 
some settler desertions is also beginning to emerge. According to a report from 
settlement officials from Guraferda woreda (Benchmaji Zone, SNNPR) settler 
desertions or desire to return are due to the following reasons: a) the monthly 
ration of 15 kg of grain flour per person is insufficient; b) settlement sites are 
hot and unhealthy; c) there is no access to clean water, and health services are 
inadequate; c) families left behind by settlers are not provided any support and 
hence are facing difficulties; d) hand tools provided are of poor quality; and e) 
no land has been distributed to settlers. 
Residents in the host communities have been mobilized to provide 
assistance to the newcomers; these include house construction and funds for the 
purchase of basic necessities. We do not know whether such mobilization has 
been voluntary or done under pressure. It is evident also that there are no plans 
to provide benefits to host communities and in the long this will definitely lead 
to resentment and hostility to settlers (Feleke 2003). 
It is quite evident that settlers are being confronted with the same 
livelihood problems that their counterparts in the 1980s had to cope with: an 
unfamiliar and difficult habitat, lack of basic services, shortage of food and 
other necessities, shortage of farm assets, etc. The settler population consists of 
household heads only in some cases, and whole families in others. The 
government insists that resettlement is a voluntary program undertaken with the 
full consent of the participants, but this was what the Derg claimed also. 
Resettlement programs have been tried in this country under various policy 
frameworks but the result has been highly unsatisfactory. I have argued 
elsewhere that there have been few successful large-scale resettlement programs 
in the developing world (Dessalegn 2003b). Voluntary or involuntary relocation 
of populations on a large-scale is a complex, costly and, in the end, wasteful 
undertaking. Some may argue that small-scale settlement schemes, which are 
more manageable and easier to undertake are more cost-effective, but in this 
country, both under the Derg and at present, resettlement is meant to solve 
many diverse problems hence policy makers only favour large-scale programs. 
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5. Migration 
It is interesting to note that growing rural poverty has not been accompanied by 
large-scale, voluntary, and long-term migration out of the rural areas. Migration 
here is of two kinds: rural to urban migration, and rural to rural migration. The 
first involves migration in search primarily of non-agricultural income 
opportunities and alternative life-styles, while the second involves migration in 
search of farmland and environmental resources. There has been migration to 
the cities and to other rural areas in the past but it has been on a modest scale. 
The mass relocation of populations in the 1980s was initiated and executed by 
the government. 
However, there has been short-term, seasonal migration in search of 
temporary employment. This was quite extensive during the Imperial regime, 
but was severely undermined by the radical policies of the Derg. At present, 
seasonal migration does take place but on a limited scale (Lakew et al. 2002). 
The evidence is incomplete but it does appear that seasonal migration is mostly 
rural to rural. The discussion that follows will not be concerned with seasonal 
migration but with long-term and voluntary migration. 
There are many reasons why large-scale voluntary migration to urban 
areas or distant rural locations has not been attempted. An important point that 
has a bearing on both types of migration is that the country's economy continues 
to be heavily dependent on agriculture, which means that there are very limited 
alternative employment options available to draw populations out of the rural 
areas. A second important reason is land policy: a rights holder who is absent 
from his/her kebelle for an extended period of time (over two years according to 
the legislation in Tigrai, for example) loses his/her allotment. A landless person 
who is not resident in his/her kebelle will have no chance of acquiring an 
allotment. In brief, the land system has inhibited rural to urban as well as rural 
to rural migration. A third reason is that with the political division of the 
country along ethnic lines, migration across ethnic boundaries has become far 
more difficult and, in some cases, highly risky. 
But both historically as well as currently, other reasons have also 
discouraged would-be migrants from the rural areas. Let us look briefly first at 
rural to urban migration. 
Ethiopia is the least urbanized country in Africa. According to the latest 
(1994) census, only about fifteen percent of the population lives in the urban 
areas while the comparable figure for Sub-Saharan Africa is 34 per cent. 
Among the reasons why the towns have not served as a strong magnate for rural 
migrants, the following are significant: a) urban areas have not offered ample 
employment opportunities; b) housing and other services in the towns are in 
short supply; c) limited road infrastructure and public transport deter would-be 
migrants. 
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Rural to rural migration did not take the form of large-scale population 
movement to distant locations. First, there was limited free l°nd available for 
farming by would-be migrants. Where land was available, it required heavy 
investment and a long waiting period before such land was suitable for farming. 
There was also the issue of security of holding once the land was under 
cultivation. Secondly, even during the imperial period, the land system did not 
encourage out-migration, and this was made even more unattractive following 
the reform of the 1970s. At present, due to the ethnic division of the country, 
inter-regional migration is not attractive. However, there has been population 
movement within the rural areas but this has taken the fonn of shifts and 
encroachments by highlanders into the adjoining lowlands and marginal areas. 
The space that is encroached upon is the interface between the highlands and 
the lowlands, space that customarily has been used or claimed by pastoralist and 
transhumant communities. Frequently, such locations are ecologically fragile 
with limited carrying capacity. As a consequence, they were in the past mainly 
used for grazing livestock but are now being cultivated. 
6. The Emerging Land Market 
It is important to note that peasants have a dynamic view of land tenure: they 
believe that land must "move" to those who are likely to make use of it more 
productively. Even at the time of the Derg, when almost all forms of land 
transfer were prohibited, peasants found ways to bend the rules to suit their 
needs. The informal land market was at the time severely circumscribed 
nevertheless it continued to play a vital role in helping peasants cope under the 
most difficult circumstances. 
There were numerous forms of land transfer during the Derg. Though 
these differed from one locality to another, they included land rentals, 
sharecropping, joint use, short-term contracts, and occasionally mortgages- all 
of course undertaken clandestinely. If we add to these the numerous 
arrangements which peasants employed to get access to oxen or labour (for 
example short term "leases", land loans, exchange, etc.), the diversity of the 
practice becomes obvious. Land was also transferred through inheritance and 
the marriage endowment. 
Current land policy allows short-term land transfers, although in some 
cases these are encumbered by conditionalities. Nevertheless, the present 
system is better in this regard than the previous one. Land transfer practices are 
just as complex at present as they were in the past. Currently, the most common 
forms of short-term land transfer are sharecropping, rentals, land loans, and 
limited "leases". Long-term transfers include inheritance and endowments. 
There are several kinds of endowments, the most common of which is the 
marriage endowment. Since land cannot be sold, mortgaged or exchanged on 
long-term bases, these forms of transfer are not part of the land market although 
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there is some evidence to suggest that peasants are engaging in such transfers, 
including land sales, surreptitiously in some areas (Bruce, Hoben and Dessalegn 
1994). 
As in the past, the informal land market is made more diverse in response 
to peasants' need to get access to farm oxen. The available evidence shows that 
nearly one-third of rural households do not own any oxen at all, and more than a 
quarter have only one ox each (Dessalegn 1997). Thus oxen are a precious 
asset, and peasants employ numerous arrangements, including land rentals and 
sharecropping, to get access to them. This aspect of the land market will 
continue to be significant because the rural areas are losing large livestock 
populations due to recurrent drought. Moreover, the informal land market must 
be seen in conjunction with the informal labour market in the rural areas. 
Access to land through the market, especially by well-to-do households, creates 
demand for seasonal labour. This aspect of the land market has not often been 
examined closely (see Abebe 2000). 
Overall, rentals and sharecropping are the most common forms of land 
transactions. There is also "land loans" which are favoured by women-headed 
households that have rights to land as well as by elderly households or 
households constrained by ill-health and unable to farm the land. But practices 
differ from community to community, and in a good number of occasions, a 
particular form of land transfer may be known by one name in one locality and 
by a different one in another. In a survey undertaken by ILRI among a small 
sample of households in four PAs in rural Arsi in 1994, it was found that 16 
percent of all cultivated plots were contracted, with 31 percent being fixed 
rentals, 25 percent being sharecropped, and the remaining 44 percent "borrowed 
or gifted" (Ahmed et al 2002: 12). A similar study in one woreda in Arsi found 
that 24 percent of fields were farmed under some kind of short contract. Here 
too, land transfers included rentals, sharecropping and borrowing and gifting 
(Gavian and Amare 1996). The last two, the authors point out, are transferred 
free of charge, which does not sound convincing unless the authors are referring 
to fields transferred as inheritance or endowments. The IDS study noted above 
reports that 29 percent of the sample households were operating rented land. 
The evidence suggests that more household plots will be under contract in 
communities with more poor people. 
These and other studies show that the duration of contract is often one to 
two years, and rarely over three years. Rights holders are reluctant to transfer 
their plots for longer periods partly because it is not allowed, and partly because 
of the fear that the contracting part will lay claim to the land if he/she gets to 
use it for a long period, and partly due to the fear of losing the land should there 
be fresh redistribution9. Insecurity of tenure has impacted on the land market: 
9 Dessalegn 1994; Brace, Hoben and Dessalegn 1994; Gavian and Amare 1996; Gavian and Ehui 
1996; Abebe 2000. For a broader debate on land markets see Tesfay Teklu 2003, forthcoming. 
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there is a good deal of uncertainty and apprehension among rights holders 
regarding land contracts. 
There are two forms of rentals at present: rentals for a fixed payment in 
kind or in cash. It is interesting that' cash rentals are becoming common at 
present (Yared 2002); this is a new development and quite uncommon in the 
Imperial period. Sharecropping arrangements are numerous, but the most 
common ones include a percentage of the harvest or a fixed share of the harvest. 
The rate depends on whether or not the rights holder contributes inputs, labour 
or oxen and how much such contribution is valued. While in general peasants 
prefer land transactions to be undertaken among kin, close friends or 
neighbours, the practice is not restricted to such relations and is becoming 
increasing open to members of the community, or persons from outside (such as 
businessmen, etc) if they come with good "credentials". On the other hand, land 
loans are frequently made by one close kin to another. 
Who are the active participants in the land market? Rights holders who 
contract out their land are often poor households, women-headed households, or 
households constrained by lack of labour (due to age, health or other factors) 
and of oxen. Those who seek land frequently are the landless (who are often 
young ones who missed out during redistribution), and enterprising peasants 
who wish either to escape poverty or to improve their income. The latter consist 
of peasants from the better-off social category (Dessalegn 1994; Yared 2002). 
Yared's recent study shows that cash rentals are increasingly favoured by young 
peasants who have returned from the towns or other areas with employment 
opportunities and have saved up sufficient money to purchase an ox and/or to 
rent farmland in their communities. In peri-urban areas, small businessmen rent 
land in cash from peasants to grow vegetables and other produce for the urban 
market. 
It is quite likely that user documentation may promote assurance among 
rights holders and hence make land transactions more secure. Landholders may 
now feel secure enough to rent out their plots to fellow farmers for longer 
periods than is the practice at the moment. This may promote better 
management of the land by the renter, and better price for the owner. 
It is quite clear that even though the land market is not functioning at its 
full potential, and is artificially constrained by policy measures (vid. Tesfaye 
Teklu forthcoming), it is nevertheless playing an important role in addressing 
the deficiencies of the land system. I shall point to four important functions of 
the land market: a) it helps to ensure that land moves from those, who, due to a 
variety of constraints, cannot use it productively to those who can; b) it is 
helping to meet the needs of the landless: landless peasants have the opportunity 
to get access to land through the land market; c) it provides opportunities for 
enterprising (and well endowed) peasants to enlarge their farm operations; d) it 
offers a reliable source of income to poor rights holders who would otherwise 
be in dire straits. Yared's study noted above contains some sixteen case 
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histories, most of which showing how land rentals, sharecropping and other 
land transfers helped peasants cope with difficult circumstances and even 
enabled some to escape poverty. 
7. Conclusion: The Way Ahead 
7.1 Issues for Debate 
I shall not attempt to summarize the arguments raised in this paper but will 
present instead a series of broad recommendations that I hope will serve as the 
starting point for informed debate on the land tenure security. The land issue is 
a cross-cutting issue: it has a strong bearing on a wide range of subjects and 
policy problems, including agricultural development, food security, natural 
resource management, poverty reduction, and even human rights. In 
predominantly agrarian societies such as Ethiopia, land is the most critical asset, 
and any discussion of socio-economic development will have to examine the 
agrarian structure and the land system. 
Since 1994, land tenure in this country has become a constitutional issue. 
This is unfortunate because in the long run this will aggravate the rigidities of 
the land system, making timely changes in tenure more difficult. The broad 
conclusion that emerges from a close look at the history of land tenure in the 
last fifty years in this country is that successive reform and policy measures 
have failed to modernize the land system. 
Nevertheless, in view of the discussions presented above, the following 
issues need to be considered carefully in any fresh debate on the subject. 
7.1.1 A Plea for a Fresh Debate 
First, we must make every effort to promote a sustained debate on the subject. A 
recent document of the World Bank made what to rural development specialists 
in this country sounds a rather astonishing claim, namely that "there is a 
surprising dearth of current research on land", but nevertheless the "scanty 
evidence that is available suggests that the current land policy is not a major 
constraint to food security" (World Bank 1999: 54). As the references at the end 
of this study indicate, there has been considerable research on the land issue 
within academia and research institutions on the one hand, and among civil 
society on the other10. The conclusion on land and food security arrived at by 
the World Bank reflects one point of yiew in the debate. 
However, it is obvious that the quality of the current debate is quite uneven 
and leaves a lot to be desired. Some of the debate reflects a singular concern 
over the subject of ownership, leading to a polarized argument around the issue 
10 See also references in Tesfaye Teklu 2003. 
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of state versus private ownership. The government and its supporters are 
adamant that there is no alternative to state ownership, while some of its critics 
are equally convinced that private ownership is the only way out. This has not 
served a useful purpose and it is important to move away from such sterile 
discussion. On the other hand, the recent stand of the Prime Minister, 
announcing that as far the governing party and his government are concerned, 
the land issue is a dead issue and a debate on it is not welcome, is ill advised. 
A sustained and informed debate on the subject, based on research and the 
views of the stakeholders themselves, is necessary if we are to address the 
complex problems of rural development and natural resource management. 
7.1.2 Tenure Security 
Despite the new initiatives underway in the last half dozen years or so, and 
despite in particular user right documentation, tenure insecurity still remains the 
overriding problem of the land system in this country. Given the right mix of 
policies and legislation, tenure security is possible under most tenure regimes. 
Conversely there is ample evidence to show that insecurity does occur under 
private tenure regimes. The important point here is that the debate on land can 
be fruitfully conducted without getting bogged down on whether one tenure 
regime is better than another. I submit that the search for tenure security should 
be the central objective that should inform the debate. 
Tenure insecurity has been aggravated not just because of the threat of 
periodic redistribution, but also due to the following factors: a) increasing rural 
poverty and the fact that farm life is becoming unviable; b) growing population 
pressure and increasing land scarcity; c) interventionist measures by 
government officials in the field leading to extra-legal decisions affecting land 
matters; d) the lack of knowledge on the part of rights holders of their rights and 
their inability to defend their rights; e) the lack of a proper and accessible 
juridical body responsible for land disputes. 
There are three key factors that have a strong bearing on security of tenure: 
a) The duration of rights: the landholder has a right to the land on a continuous 
basis for good or for long enough to have an incentive to improve or invest on 
it. b) The assurance of rights', the landholder feels assured that his/her rights are 
not arbitrarily overridden by others, including the state. The loss of rights 
should occur only in exceptional circumstances and should be a result of due 
process, the decision of a court of law, or according to the provisions of a 
contract, in which case, the holder will be compensated in full for the land 
and/or the investments on it. c) Robustness of rights-, the holder has the freedom 
to use, dispose of or transfer the land free from interference by others, including 
the state. While user documentation is to be welcome and is a step in the right 
direction, the current land system still falls short in assuring rights holders of 
security of tenure in the full sense of the word. 
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But tenure security also depends on past decisions of policy makers or 
authority systems and historical experiences. Recurrent political instability, the 
loss of respect for the law by the public or the frequent resort to arbitrary 
decisions by power holders will create or exacerbate insecurity in general and 
tenure insecurity in particular. Once insecurity becomes widespread, as it did 
due to the Derg's radical rural reforms and agricultural policies and the frequent 
land redistributions that have been going for nearly two decades, it is very 
difficult to reverse it. It is not enough, for instance, to put a statement in a 
policy document or an article in a legislation announcing that no more 
redistribution will be undertaken by the government. The farming population 
does not have access to policy documents in most cases. 
The first step in promoting tenure security must begin with a formal 
decision by the government at the Federal and Killil level to remove the threat 
of future redistribution of land. Such a categorical decision has been made by 
Oromia Killil's legislation only. Once this is in place, a concerted campaign 
must be undertaken by authorities at the community level in particular to 
convince peasants that redistribution is a thing of the past. Further, tenure 
security can be promoted: by extending the scope of the land market and giving 
it legal support; by restricting the intervention of government agencies to 
extension work and removing their right to intervene in land matters; by giving 
the courts the sole authority on land matters, including land disputes, 
dispossessions, land transactions, etc. No decision on land should be binding on 
rights holders unless it is made through the legal process and is the decision of 
legitimate courts. 
In this connection, it will be worth revisiting the land legislations 
discussed at some length above. It is the opinion of this author that the 
conditionalities described in the Tigrai but more importantly the Amhara 
legislation are unfair and counter-productive; they will lead to conflict in the 
long run. The Amhara legislation has a wide range of conditionalities, including 
not only soil and water conservation, but care for the vegetation on farm plots, 
"proper" farming practices, weeding, flood control, etc. Most of these 
obligations imposed on the farmer are best left to extension programs. What is 
of serious concern is however that the determination of the fulfillment of these 
obligations, and the penalties involved for failure, both of which are left to the 
discretion of the bureaucracy, will fuel conflict. Moreover, the encouragement 
given to individual citizens to report to the authorities about cases of abuse of 
land in the Amhara draft policy document will, in the long run, inflame passions 
and set neighbor against neighbor, and peasant against peasant. 
Finally, tenure security will not be assured unless rights holders are 
cognizant of the law and can defend their rights. An informed peasantry is an 
empowered peasantry. There is a long tradition in this country of keeping rural 
people in the dark on the part of the state bureaucracy especially in matters that 
directly affect their lives. Very few peasants in the country have any knowledge 
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of laws and policy decisions regarding, for example, land tenure, agricultural 
development, environmental protection, etc. The same may be said of officials 
at the woreda and kebelle level. Hence, ways must be foirnd to ensure that 
peasants as well as lower level officials are fully informed and have ready 
access to the relevant documents when the need arises". This is of course easier 
said than done: it would require considerable resources, for example, to provide 
each rural household in a killil (or even each kebelle office) with a copy of the 
relevant land legislation. But this is not reason enough to keep stakeholders in 
the dark. For example, copies of the relevant law could be distributed to 
peasant leaders, officials of cooperatives, community representatives, and in 
some cases local religious leaders. One could also enlist the support of NGOs 
working in rural communities, though what this will actually entail should be 
left to the Killils and the NGOs concerned to work out. 
7.1.3 User Right Documentation 
The literature on African land tenure suggests that land registration and the 
issuance of title documents does not necessarily lead to tenure security in all 
circumstances. The evidence indicates that registration and titling may have a 
positive impact on security and farm efficiency in conditions where the land is 
unusually productive and employed to grow high value cash crops (for example, 
irrigated plots), and where there is good access to profitable markets. Moreover, 
for registration and titling to be effective, cadastral surveys and a modern 
system of record keeping are essential, without which the program could lead to 
increased conflict and uncertainty. But modern surveying techniques and 
establishing an efficient system of land registry are very costly12. 
Many peasants interviewed for this study in both Killils were positive 
about the issuance of use right documents though a few in Amhara were 
uncertain and cautious in their comments. There is a feeling that the documents 
will provide holders greater security than was possible in the past. Many of 
those who gave favorable opinions pointed to numerous unsound practices that 
peasants were forced to employ because of tenure insecurity, and some of these 
practices have been discussed earlier in this study. However, documentation has 
been undertaken without adequate preparation, in the absence of basic plot 
identification and registration tools (surveys, mapping, etc), and without a 
proper system of land registration. While documentation has currently helped 
reduce or minimize some problems, new problems and hence new conflicts will 
arise in the future unless modern techniques are employed to improve the 
system now in use. 
" I believe a program of information dissemination should be aimed equally at both peasant and 
local official. A program benefiting the latter only will serve to further subordinate the peasant to 
the state. 
12 For the literature see Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994, IIED 2004; also Raisin. 
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We have also noted that documentation is being undertaken under the 
existing legal and policy framework. Unless this framework is changed, and 
unless there is legislative harmonization, the positive results of documentation 
will soon be eroded. Finally, documentation has been carried out under 
conditions of severe population pressure. The rural population is growing at the 
rate of three percent per year which means that the land resources of the 
countryside are under extreme pressure. There is a high rate of land 
fragmentation, land which is marginal and which in the past was used mainly 
for grazing has been brought under cultivation, and resource degradation is 
proceeding at an alarming rate. These conditions will in the end undo the 
benefits of user documentation. In any event, user documentation by itself, 
however well it is undertaken, will not be sufficient to ensure full tenure 
security. 
7.1.4. Population Movement 
As noted above, the countryside is carrying an enormous population that is 
dependent on an increasingly diminishing asset base. The problem is further 
compounded by the fact that there is very limited population movement out of 
the rural areas. While agriculture is virtually the sole economic activity of rural 
households, the combination of land degradation, land fragmentation, 
uneconomic farm plots, and population pressure has had the effect of depressing 
food output and productivity. There are very limited off-farm employment 
opportunities: the rural economy here is perhaps one of the least diversified in 
Africa. For most rural households, food insecurity is the most critical problem. 
Periodic food crises and major famines have had a devastating effect on the 
farming population in the north, the east and central part of the country. In fact, 
it may be safe to say that perhaps only a third of the rural population may be 
said to be tolerably food secure at any given time. 
These conditions make it imperative that government consider 
development options that will help draw a good percentage of the population 
out of agriculture. The chances of stimulating rapid growth in the agricultural 
sector are better with greatly reduced population pressure. Creating the enabling 
environment for the private and the public sector to generate employment 
opportunities on a large scale is one option worth considering. Encouraging 
economic diversification is a second option. A third may be investing on the 
necessary infrastructure to encourage rapid growth in the modern sector. A 
fourth option may be rapid growth in urbanization and investments on urban 
services to enable such growth. Urban growth accompanied by increasing 
employment opportunities will attract a large number of rural migrants. With 
only 15 percent urbanization, the country is, comparatively speaking, virtually 
"unurbanized" and is thus capable of higher levels of urbanization. Current 
development policy has relegated the urban centers and the modern sector of the 
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economy to a secondary status, but in the light of the arguments presented here 
it will be important to revisit the issue. 
7.1.5. Resettlement 
The government's resettlement program, which has been launched in several 
Killils, will be faced with many constraints. First, the optimism of decision-
makers that there is plenty of unused land to accommodate settlers from the 
highlands is not borne out by the facts. There is very little unused land in this 
country, much less land that can be cultivated with existing peasant technology. 
The vast area of the country that is categorized as "uncultivated" land has the 
following characteristics: a) it lies in arid or semi-arid ecologies; b) it is used as 
grazing land by the neighbouring peasantry or pastoralist communities; c) it 
would require huge investment in water development, infrastructure, health and 
other social services to bring it under cultivation. Secondly, large-scale 
resettlement programs are costly and at present the government does not have 
the resources to undertake them. Thirdly, while the country did have many years 
of resettlement experience, it has now lost the resettlement expertise. Most of 
the trained personnel who were capable of planning, programming, executing 
and monitoring resettlement programs have left government service or are no 
longer available. To the best of my knowledge, they have not been replaced by a 
new generation of staff trained in the field of settlement. 
The settlement programs under way at present were undertaken without 
serious public debate, which is unfortunate because there is a need for extended 
discussion on the subject and wide public consultation. Despite the argument 
presented above, however, I believe the resettlement option should not be 
foreclosed but there should be a sustained debate on the matter. 
7.1.6. The Land Market 
We have seen above that despite the restricted circumstances, there is an active 
land market in the rural areas. What is also significant is that the market seems 
to be meeting the deficiencies of the land system to a good extent. In particular, 
it offers the following benefits: a) the market provides opportunities for the 
landless, who in many localities are also the young, to get access to land; b) it 
serves to provide a source of income for poor households; c) it enables 
enterprising peasants who are better endowed to expand their farm operations; 
d) finally, it makes the land system, which otherwise is quite rigid, a little more 
dynamic by enabling land to move from those who are unable to use it 
productively to those who can. 
One justification for periodic redistribution is that it will serve to solve the 
problem of landlessness. We have seen above that redistribution does not solve 
that problem but instead exacerbates insecurity. I believe a more robust and 
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more dynamic land market will go a long way to address the problem of 
landlessness. The advantage here is that the market will not bring with it the 
harmful after-effects associated in particular with redistribution. However, to 
make the land market more vigorous and more open it should be legally 
supported. 
Tenure security will invigorate the land market by making land transfers 
legal and above board, which would further open up the market. This in turn 
will encourage investment on the land because the landholder will know that 
he/she can recoup the investment since the value of the land will appreciate. 
Open land markets help to boost the value of the land while illegal land markets 
tend to depress it. 
While it is too early to judge at the moment, there is reason to believe that 
user documentation will improve the functioning of the land market. Peasants 
may now feel that they are more secure in their holding and will be willing to 
rent out or in land for longer periods. They will also be able to negotiate a fair 
price for their rights. 
The implicit argument of the government's land policy that rural 
differentiation is bad because it promotes conflict is unconvincing. I believe 
social differentiation that emerges through hard work, initiative, risk taking, and 
enterprise, should be encouraged because peasants who achieve a higher status 
through such means will be the driving force of a dynamic rural economy. The 
land market helps to encourage this kind of positive differentiation. 
7.2. Gender and Land 
In view of the discussions presented under section 2.1 and the gender 
dimensions of the Killil legislation noted in section 2.2 above, the following 
points are relevant in any fresh debate on land policy. 
Since land has been distributed to individuals rather than households, 
women have been able to get land, however, they are at a disadvantage in other 
respects. The country has a diversity of cultures with regard to gender and 
property ownership. Women are in a better position to receive and keep land in 
those communities where in the past, i.e. before the radical reforms of the Derg, 
they were allowed to own land by customary law. It is comparatively more 
difficult for women to hold on to their allotments in communities where 
customary practice did not allow it. 
Moreover, some of the conditionalities of rights to land included in the 
legislations we have looked at above impose increased burdens on women and 
thus put their rights at greater risk. The restrictions placed on residence by the 
Tigrai legislation will place women at a disadvantage because on marriage they 
may move from the kebelle of their parents to that of their husbands. For 
women, as opposed for men, the marriage bond is an important condition of 
ensuring rights to their land. There are strong pressures on women to give up 
40 
the family plot in the event of the death of their husbands. 
The registration of husband and wife and the recording of both names in 
user documents in Amhara is a welcome measure. In contrast, the issuance of 
user certificates in Tigrai in the name of the household head only is a serious 
threat to the rights of women. A recent study of women's access to rural land in 
Tigrai concludes that there are .also legal gaps especially with respect to 
marriage registration and multiple marriages that constrain women's rights in 
general and rights to property in particular (Mahari Redae 2003). These issues, 
i.e. marriage registration on the one hand and the practice of multiple wives by 
men on the other are serious issues which will constrain women from asserting 
their rights to property. 
Women-headed households are dependent on the land market to keep their 
land under cultivation (Yigremew 2001; Zenebeworke and Yared 2000). Such 
households either rent out their land or enter into an agreement for co-farming 
with males because tradition in many areas prohibits women from ploughing 
land, or because the burden of child and home care makes it difficult for women 
to be fully engaged in all aspects of farming. This puts them at a disadvantage, 
making them dependent on male labor. 
What is lacking in the land law is specific measures to protect the rights of 
women landholders. Such measures are necessary because there is a wide 
variety of cultural institutions and practices in many parts of the country 
(multiple marriages, denial of the right to inherit or hold property, etc) that deny 
women rights enshrined in the country's Constitution and other legal documents 
(see also EWLA 2004). Those charged with land administration at the kebelle 
level are predominantly men and their decisions on land matters often put 
women at a disadvantage. 
The Oromia legislation discussed above goes some way to address this 
problem, and in this, as in other respects, it is better than the other Killil 
legislations. It emphasizes that men and women have equal rights and equal 
access to land. The family land will be registered, and a certificate issued in 
both the husband's and wife's name, and in case of divorce, the land is equally 
divided between them after taking into account the needs of siblings that may be 
involved. If the man has more than one wife, he will receive a joint certificate 
with only one wife; the other wives will have the land registered under their 
own names and a certificate issued to each of them. There are similar articles in 
the legislation of the Southern Killil. 
Finally, rural women will not be able to take advantage of the rights they 
have gained until there is a strong women's organization, either based in the 
rural areas or with an effective presence there, that is capable of protecting these 
rights. Given the pervasive power of patriarchal attitudes and of tradition, 
peasant women rarely raise their voice and even more rarely are they heard 
where and when it matters. The immense burden of home management, 
childcare and farm labor excludes them from participating in most aspects of 
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community governance. Their chances of benefiting from gender-sensitive 
reforms are also limited due to their lack of knowledge of legal opportunities 
and of the workings of government institutions. Civil society organizations 
working with farmers can help to educate rural women of their rights and 
opportunities but in the long run the women themselves will have to build their 
own organization if they are to ensure their rights 
7.3 Searching for Tenure Security 
Despite the recent attempts of the government to smooth out some of the rough 
edges, the land system remains inefficient, restrictive and a serious obstacle to 
the modernization of the rural economy. The system gives the state immense 
power over the hard pressed peasantry- it is, in other words, a political weapon 
that has enabled the state to exercise unchallenged domination in the 
countryside. This explains why the government is vehemently opposed to any 
tenure regime that threatens to loosen its control over landed property. 
It will be presumptuous to recommend a formula for a "good land 
proclamation" applicable in all Killils since a sound legislation must be based 
on objective conditions in each locality or Killil, should grow out of broad-
based consultations with all concerned, in particular peasant leaders, and should 
incorporate the experiences of the past. Past experiences, including those since 
the mid-1970s, differ from one Killil to another. Moreover, in the period before 
the radical reforms of the 1970s, tenure practices, as well as customary laws 
having to do with women's rights to land, varied significantly from one part of 
the country to another. Thus, it would be quite unwise to suggest a uniform 
legislation for all localities. 
On the other hand, there are certain basic rights of tenure which should be 
enforced in all areas because they will promote security and a dynamic land 
system. The objective of policy in our context should be the modernization of 
the land system. 
The central elements of such a system should revolve around the following: 
• It should ensure full tenure security in the sense noted above (security 
for all including women); periodic redistribution or the threat of 
redistribution should be expressly prohibited and there should be an 
awareness campaign to inform all stakeholders. 
• Land legislation should not promise each adult citizen in the rural areas 
the right to land as the Constitution and the Killil legislations do. 
Indeed, while the three Killils promise land to all rural adults in their 
respective jurisdictions, the Southern Killil makes rights to land a right 
of all the country's citizens. In the circumstances of high rates of 
population growth and shrinking land resources, such promise is 
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dangerous. It means either periodic land distribution or a betrayal of 
(young) peasant expectations. 
• Existing initiatives of user rights documentation should be continued 
but using modern techniques of mapping, surveying, and land 
registration. 
• A sound policy should allow the free movement of land from those who 
cannot use it, or not use it efficiently, to those who can. Such policy 
should make land transactions more secure, efficient and free from all 
unnecessary bureaucratic encumbrances. The setting of time limits for 
all land rentals, the criteria of technology use, and the registration of 
rental agreements with the kebelle or woreda office are such 
encumbrances. A simple framework for secure contracts is sufficient. 
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• Remove all conditions and user obligations from the legislation that 
directly or indirectly either justify or invite government interference in 
land matters; sound obligations that promote efficiency and security 
should be included but they should be precisely and unambiguously 
worded as to leave no space for government interference. Planting trees, 
soil conservation measures, timely weeding, etc., all of which are listed 
as obligations of rights holders in all Killil legislations, are best left to 
extension programs. Peasants with secure rights to their holdings will 
have a strong incentive to employ sound land management practices; in 
any event, many of the obligations listed in the legislations are part of 
indigenous land management practices of the local population. 
• Land policy should provide a sound and practical judicial framework 
for land disputes as well as for rights holders to protect their rights in 
the event that government authorities violate them or threaten to violate 
them. Such a judicial framework is absent from current policy or poorly 
provided. 
• An efficient land system will ensure that no decision or measure is 
taken by local authorities that jeopardizes the rights of holders without 
due process, a court decision or the rule of law 
Finally, a government which has the welfare of the rural population at heart 
and which is keen to promote a dynamic land system will enable rights holders 
to have access to all relevant legal and policy documents so that they are able to 
defend their rights in court or in other appropriate forums; this will empower 
farming people and peasant communities. Government could solicit the support 




1. Changes in Property Rights and Formal Institutions 1975-2004 
Period Institutional Change 
1975-77 Land reform legislations, and redistribution of land. PAs 
established. Also established: Judicial tribunals; defence 
squads; women's associations. Nationalization of forestry; 
two types of forestry ownership: state and community. 
1977 State farms? launched. 
1977-80 Renewed land redistribution 
1978-79 Cooperative societies. Progress in 
collectivization. 
1978-86 Villagization in rapid progress. Also, massive program of 
resettlement. Both villagization and resettlement 
undertaken against a background of famine and war. 
1982 PAs restructured 
1990 Mixed economy reforms affecting socialization, grain 
marketing. Dissolution of cooperatives, villagization. 
1991 The fall of the Derg regime 
1991-93 Collapse of resettlement program. Large numbers of 
settlers return to their original homes. 
1992-94 Ethnic decentralization and federalism. Reform of local 
government, kebelles with new authority. Private property 
(except in land) ensured by constitution. Tenure system 
modified but not changed. Common-property resources 
(forests) under Killil and local control 
1995-98 Return of cooperatives; reorganized at kebelle 
level. 
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1997 Land redistribution in Amhara Killil. The authority for land 
administration delegated to the Killils by Federal law 
1997-2002 "Redisricting": redrawing kebelle boundaries. Land 
administration in Tigrai. 
2000 Land use and administration legislation in Amhara; other 
Killils following suit. 
2000-02 Common lands on hillsides distributed to individual 
peasants in Amhara. Rationale: to encourage individual 
afforestation schemes. 
2001-02 Policy of decentralized rural development. Woredas and 
kebelles to be focal point of development program 
implementation. 
2002 Land use and administration legislation of Oromia issued. 
2003 Massive resettlement program launched 
2003-04 User right documents given out in some Killils 
2004 Land administration legislation finalized in 
SNNPRS 
Source: Dessalegn 1984; Pausewang et al. (eds.) 1990; Ege 1997; Killil legislations 
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2. Area, Production and Yield of Major Crops 19780/81-2000/01 
(Both Seasons) 
Year Area Production Yield 
(Mn. Ha.) (Mn. On.) (Qn/Ha) 
80/81 5.7 56.6 11.6 
81/82 5.7 63.0 11.1 
82/83 6.1 78.1 12.8 
83/84 5.7 63.4 11.1 
84/85 5.9 48.6 8.2 
85/86 6.0 54.0 9.0 
86/87 5.6 62.6 11.2 
87/88 5.9 66.0 11.1 
88/89 5.8 71.9 12.5 
89/90 5.8 68.5 11.9 
Average 80/81-
89/90 
5.8 64.2 11.1 
93/94 7.2 57.4 8.0 
94/95 7.7 75.0 9.7 
95/96 9.1 103.3 11.4 
96/97 8.9 104.4 11.7 
97/98 7.7 81.0 10.5 
98/99 8.5 88.7 10.4 
99/00 8.9 92.3 10.4 




Source: Based on computation from CSO/CSA in Dessalegn 2003a. 
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